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"THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL COST"
-AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH*
H. H. LIEBHAFSKY**
The arguments, conclusions, and policy recommendations presented by R. H. Coase I in his 1960 paper-"The Problem of Social
Cost"-have by now been embraced and refined by many economists,
with an occasional dissent here and there. Indeed, a survey, 2
published in December of 1972, of works dealing with economic
theory and property rights, lists more than 120 articles and books on
subjects ranging from economic theories of property rights and "an
economic theory of constitutions" to economic theories of tort
liability, including Coase's paper. His paper was the pump primer.
Much of this flood of the printed word has been explicitly or
implicitly concerned with a discussion of policies to deal with
environmental pollution, and-more often than not-the verbal solutions to the hypothetical problems stated have resulted in the same
conclusion; namely, in the real world, laissez-faire is, after all, the
best solution for dealing with such problems; provided however, only,
that the author's definition of best and his assumption of his conclusion
in his statement of the problem are granted.
This paper consists of two parts in addition to this introduction. In
the second part I will discuss the philosophical preconceptions which
constitute the basis of a spiritual and methodological kinship which
exists among the various works seeking to produce new and permanently settled meanings in many areas of the law already
mentioned in my opening paragraph, and I will compare these
philosophical positions with their counterparts in jurisprudence. In
the second part I will also provide a statement of the philosophical
position which supports the alternative approach to the problem I
will present in the third part and compare that position with its
counterpart in legal philosophy. In the third part I will provide an
economic and legal analysis of Coase's arguments and of his solution
* This essay is dedicated to Clarence Ayres who died at the age of 81 in Alamogordo, New
Mexico in July 1972. For 31 years he was my friend and teacher, and for nearly 40 his was the
most compelling voice in the Department of Economics, University of Texas. He played an
important role in the establishment of the Association for Evolutionary Economics and served as
its first president. Today economists are paying more and more attention to "relevant" problems
to which Clarence Ayres pointed 30 years ago. His original ideas had an impact upon those of all
who knew him; the influence of his ideas on my own is clearly evident in this paper.
** Professor, Department of Economics, University of Texas at Austin.
1. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1960).
2. Furutobn & Pejovich, Property Rights and Economic Theory: A Survey of Current
Literature, 10 J. Econ. Lit. 1137 (1972):
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to the problem of social cost and present an alternative. In doing so, I
will make use of Coase's arithmetical example of a hypothetical case
involving damage to a farmer's crops by a neighboring rancher's
"inevitably" straying steers. Coase has limited his analysis to two
legal situations in which the straying is "inevitable". I will explain his
analysis and compare his results with the result produced in a case he
has not considered-one in which an equitable remedy is enforced
restraining the rancher from conducting his ranching activities "in
such manner as to inflict harm on the farmer". I will also considerprimarily to stimulate further discussion-the possibility of use of a
nonjudicial remedy in the form of administrative action to control
pollution by means of an abatement regulation combined with a tax
and a tax credit. Throughout this paper unless explicitly stated to the
contrary, I will accept for the purposes of argument, without granting
the validity of, his assumptions. Finally, I will also include in the third
part my own interpretations of four English cases involving various
legal problems used by Coase in an attempt to establish a philosophico-ethical and legal justification for his position and compare my
interpretation with the one he has presented.
THE PHILOSOPHICAL PRECONCEPTIONS
OF ORTHODOX ANALYSIS AND OF THIS PAPER
The various current economic theories of property and of legal
liability reflect-as does Coase's paper-the relevant writer's acceptance of either a secular natural law philosophy or that of logical
positivism. Occasionally the work of one or another of these writers
seems to reflect an intermingling of both points of view.
As T. E. Cliffe Leslie 3 pointed out in 1870, the secular natural law
basis of economic policy recommendations proceeds from an analysis
based on "assumptions obtained [a priori], not by interrogation, but by
the anticipation of nature; what is nature being at bottom a mere
conjecture concerning its constitution and arrangements." For example, in the 1930's Henry Simons 4 frankly admitted that his views were
based upon a conception of a "relatively absolute absolute" and
affirmed Adam Smith's view that the "invisible Hand" would lead to
the best of all possible worlds in a free market system operating in the
long run under conditions of perfect competition. Thus also, F. A. von
Hayek 5 has asserted that a very small part of the social order only can
be made a "conscious product of human reason" and that the
automatic price system is a "marvel." And Ludwig von Mises 6 has
3.
4.
5.
6.

Leslie, The PoliticalEconomy of Adam Smith, 43 Fortnightly Rev. 549, 551-552 (1870).
H Simons, Economic Policy for a Free Society (1948).
F. von Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order 87-88 (1958).
L. von Mises, Human Action 1-2, 38-40, 65, 239-40, 754-56(1949).
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proclaimed his belief in the "regularity" of social phenomena "to
which man must adjust his actions" and asserted that "the principles
of human action" (the theory of choice) are "revealed to man by the
same signs that reveal the reality of natural law, namely, the fact that
his power to attain his ends is restricted."
Probably the most useful example of a counterpart secular natural
law philosophy in law is the substantive due process interpretation of
the 14th amendment employed by the Supreme Court-from the time
of Munn v. Illinois7 in 1877 until the decision in Nebbia v. New York 8
1934-to limit the power of legislative bodies to regulate economic
activities. Contemporary natural law jurisprudence seems today to be
moving toward an intrumentalist point of view in its conception of
"natural law with a variable content." 9 But in economics those
holding this view still rely on Adam Smith's work of 1776.
The logical positivist point of view is the prevailing one in
economics, particularly among economists who hold that value
judgments are unscientific but who paradoxically devote themselves
to a study of problems of "welfare economics", including questions of
"economic efficiency" and "optimal resource allocation". This point
of view and the problems considered often involve the use of
advanced mathematical techniques to produce logical consistency
both in the attempt to discover the full meanings and implications of
new assumptions about the behavior of "economic men" (whose
existence is denied but nevertheless assumed) in the face of proposed
or actual uses of governmental power, as well, as to restate old
theories expounded verbally by earlier writers.
This approach in economics has much in common with the legal
positivism of Hans Kelsen 10 and the "analytical jurisprudence" of H.
L. A. Hart." Thus, Kelsen presupposes the existence of a Grundnorm
(the fundamental constitution) "upon which the validity of all the
norms of our legal order depends".12 All other norms in the legal
system are tested against this Grundnorm. Moreover, the Grundnorm
"is valid .because it is presupposed to be valid; it is presupposed to be
valid because without this presupposition no human act could be
interpreted as legal, especially a norm-creating act". 13 A cynic might
be tempted to remark, "It is presupposed to be valid because without
this presupposition legal positivism would have no foundation." In the
7. 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
8. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
9. J. Brierly, The Law of Nations 15 (1928).
10. H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and the State (1945).
11. H. Hart, The Concept of Law (1961).
12. H. Kelsen, supra note 10, at 116.
13. Id.
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"analytical jurisprudence" of H. L. A. Hart, the term, "secondary
rules" 14 identifies the concept Kelsen calls the Grundnorm.
The prevailing logical positivist approach to welfare economics
also has its Grundnorm or its "secondary rules", and theoretical work
in this area consists of testing policies against this presupposed
Grundnorm. But more than this: there is today a widespread
conviction on the part of economists using this approach that
economists are peculiarly entitled to sit on the thrones of philosopher
kings in our society. For example, consider the following statement
made by Professor Jules Margolis to a Senate Subcommittee, and note,
particularly, his definition of "the public interest":
.. .Who is the client and who is the employer of the economist?
The typical answer of the economist is that he is true to the
principles of serving the public interest as defined by the
profession in their scientific journals, i.e., the aggregation of
individual preferences. He selects his models and criteria so as to

maximize the professional view of the public interest .. .unfortunately the purchasers of the economist's information and advice
(the administrative officials or political leaders) are neither
persuaded by the economist's insight nor do their incentives impel
them to accept the perspective of the public interest as formulated by the economist ....15 (Emphasis added.)
J. M. Buchanan has defined "the criterion employed by a modern
welfare economist" in deciding "whether or not a given situation is
'efficient' or 'optimal' in these words:
.If, in any given situation it is found to be impossible to make
any change without making some individual in the group worse6
off, the situation is defined as Pareto-Optimal or Pareto-efficient.'
An assumption of maximization by rational individuals of their
preferences, or of the utility obtainable from their given flows of
money income at the given prices is inherent in the economist's
Grundnorm. Prices are a measure of social value. The existing
distribution of income and the status quo in property rights are also
built into the concept of Pareto optimality. Any change in income or
property rights which makes any one individual "worse off" is not
optimal. In his 1972 mathematical critique of Coase's analysis,
Baumol has stated the condition of Pareto optimality as follows:
Pareto optimality then requires maximization of the utility of
14. Hart, supra note 11, at 92.
15. 1 Joint Econ. Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess., The Analysis and Evaluation of Public
Expenditures: the PBB System, A Compendium of Papers Submitted to the Sub-Comm. on
Economy in Gov't. 538 (Joint Comm. Print 1969).
16. J. Buchanan & G. Tullock, The Calculus of Consent 172 (1962).
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any arbitrarily chosen individual, say m, subject to the requirement that there be no loss in utility to any of the other m-1
persons, i.e., given any feasible level for these other persons'
utility. The problem then is to maximize ....17
I have omitted the equations which follow this statement, however,
the first of these omitted equations may be worth a remark. It specifies
that the utility of the individual designated m (those who prefer can
designate him "one John Doe") is a function of the quantities of the
goods only. This formulation is a reflection of Baumol's "simplifying"
assumption in his analysis that "an [e]xternality (smoke) only affects
the costs of neighboring laundries, rather than causing disutility for
consumers." 18 Thus are any effects of the smoke on the physical
environment which are not included in the damaged firms' costs
excluded from the analysis.
It is instructive to consider also another definition also provided by
Buchanan in these words:
.A change is defined to be Pareto-optimal if, in the transition
from one situation to another: (1)every individual in the group is
made better off; or (2) at least one individual in the group is made
better off and no one is made worse off.19

The two definitions quoted are, of course, fundamental to the
"economic theory of political democracy" postulated by Buchanan
and Tullock,2 0 a theory which owes much to Coase's analysis.
Criticisms by economists of judicial decisions on grounds that the
decisions do not satisfy the test of Pareto optimality are largely a
reflection of the fact that the critic does not understand either the
nature or the role of the judicial process in our complex society. This
process is largely concerned with the evaluations of arguments
favoring and opposing and with making decisions producing changes
which are not Pareto optimal.
In his 1969 presidential address to the American Economic
Association, Kenneth Boulding remarked:
Many, if not most, economists accept the Pareto optimum as
almost self-evident. Nevertheless, it rests on an extremely shaky
21
foundation of ethical properties.
He then noted that the concept implies that there is neither
"malevolence nor benevolence anywhere in the system".
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Baumol, On Taxationand the Control of Externalities, 67 Am. Econ. Rev. 307, 310 (1972).
Id. at 309.
J. Buchanan & G. Tullock, supra note 16, at 172.
Id. at 55ff, 91ff.
Boulding, Economics as a Moral Science, 59 Am. Econ. Rev. 1,5 (1969).
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Some indication of an economist's conception of social welfare has
already been given above in the explanation of the nature of the
utility or preference functions usually employed in welfare analysis.
The jump from these functions to the claim that economics is the
"hardest of the social sciences", the only one able to employ
measurable concepts, is made by using market prices as measures of
social value. In a theoretical analysis the market prices used are
generally those which would exist if all firms in the economy were
operating in loig-run equilibrium positions under conditions of
perfect competition.2 2 In making a cost-benefit study, however, an
analyst is forced to face some degree of reality and to recognize that
the concept of perfect competition is merely an analytical category, a
short-hand term specifying that the theorist is assuming the existence
of certain rigorous and extreme conditions not met in the real world;
and so the cost-benefit analyst makes us of "proxy" variables selected
according to his own value judgments with, of course, one eye on the
question of whether or not his variables will be approved by the
judgments of other economists.
Turvey and Prest have accurately concluded their authoritative
survey of the subject of cost-benefit analysis by remarking that it is
"one of the useful arts" rather than a science.2 3 In the address
22. The phase "long-run equilibrium positions under conditions of perfect competition"
contains several "terms of art" used by economists. The conditions in question will be explained
in the text later, but for the benefit of readers who are not economists, I will explain the terms of
art, perfect competition, short run, and long run in this note since they play a key role in
Coase's analysis.
When an economist says he is assuming that a firm is operating under conditions of perfect
competition, he is using the term as a short-hand expression to mean that he is assuming for
analytical purposes that all firms in the industry are operating under the following conditions:
(1) there are many ("a large number") buyers and sellers, none of whom can individually affect
the market price of the commodity because the amount he produces and sells is insignificant in
relation to the total quantity changing hands at the given market price; (2) the products sold are
homogeneous (interchangeable); (3) all buyers and sellers have perfect knowledge of the
situation confronting them and of their alternatives; (4) all buyers and sellers behave so as to
maximize their self interests (utility, net revenue, or what have you) on the basis of that
knowledge; (5) freedom of entry into or exit from any industry exists, and all inputs are perfectly
mobile.
The concept of perfect competition is thus a logical category; it does not describe any real
world situation nor one that is attainable and hence cannot serve as a norm or standard to be
achieved in the world in which we live. In general, when an economist says perfect competition
is an "ideal," what he means is that the concept is the abstraction defined above-which is not
to say that there are not economists who utilize the analytical content of perfect competition as
a policy goal for its own sake when it is convenient to do so.
A short-run time period is an analytical category-a period within which it is assumed that a
firm can vary the output from its existing capacity (usually, plant size) but cannot vary that
capacity. A long-run time period is also an analytical category-a period within which it is
assumed that a firm can vary all inputs under its control, including capacity (or size of plant).
For a detailed critical explanation of these and other price theory concepts, see H.
Liebhafsky, The Nature of Price Theory (Revised ed. 1968).
23. Prest & Turvey, Cost Benefit Analysis: A Survey, 3 Surveys of Economic Theory 155
(1966).
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mentioned above, Boulding also commented on cost-benefit analyses
in these words:
Even though economic measurement may be abused, its effect
on the formation of moral judgments is great, and on the whole I
believe beneficial. The whole idea of cost-benefit analysis, for
instance, in terms of monetary units, say "real" dollars of constant
purchasing power, is of enormous importance in the evaluation of
social choices and even of social institutions. We can grant, of
course, that the "real" dollar, which is oddly enough a strictly
imaginary one, is a dangerously imperfect measure of the quality
of human life and human values. Nevertheless, it is a useful first
approximation, and in these matters of evaluation of difficult
choices it is extremely
useful to have a first approximation that we
24
can later inodify.
To which one might add, "and the user of the results of such studies
must be on his guard not to be misled by the precision with which the
results are stated numerically, nor should he forget that they are,
indeed, merely first approximations and represent quantitative statements of the qualitative or subjective judgments of the analyst making
the study."
One with legal training who has little or no knowledge of
economics is apt to think that an "econometric cost-benefit analysis"
is really an economist's "term of art" identifying an equivalent of the
judicial process of "balancing the interests." Not so, however. A
decision is made by a court after an adversary proceeding has
occurred, subject to instrumentally-defined rules of procedural due
process. In this proceeding, each of the advocates of the various
positions (including interveners) will have presented arguments and
evidence to show, why a social policy which favors the position of the
party he represents should be adopted. Also, in this proceeding, the
contesting parties will call attention to as many as possible of the
competing social policy considerations favoring their respective
positions. In making its decision, the court must keep in mind that not
only will the positions of the parties be affected by the decision made,
but also, the decision itself will constitute an incremental change in
the law. In Cardozo's words, the task of the court "is to exercise
discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined
by system and subordinated to the 'primordial necessity' of order in
social life". 2 5 All this is well understood by lawyers but not by
economists.
But now consider what is well understood by economists but,
perhaps, not by all lawyers, namely the methodology employed when
24. Boulding, supra note 31, at 7.
25. B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 41 (1921).
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and the environment in which an economist makes an econometric
cost-benefit analysis. An economist begins with the assumptions that
"preferences are to be maximized", "price is a measure of social
value", and "the distribution of income is 'given"'. He then builds a
model based upon theories produced by deductive reasoning about
hypothetical cases, and specifies what he conceives to be the
"objective" (utility or social welfare) function to be maximized
subject to known or assumed constraints. If data concerning the
variables in the model are not readily available, he makes use of
"proxy" variables for which data are available. It is not uncommon to
select the variables themselves on the basis of the availability of data.
The structure and content of the model and the study itself are
significantly influenced by availability of mathematical techniques for
dealing with the problem at hand. The value judgments built into the
model will be those acceptable to a majority of economists, a factor
which itself influences the relationships considered. No adversary
proceeding, no process to call attention to social interests which are
not measurable in money, is involved. Nor do consequences for others
rest on the conclusions reached by the analyst unless his recommendations qua conclusions are implemented by a legislative or judicial act.
In his own case, it will be his reputation, particularly among other
economists, which will be affected.
To think that the terms cost-benefit analysis (in economics) and
balancing the interests (in the judicial process) are synonymous is to
fail to understand the one or the other (and in a few cases, both) of
these concepts. An executed cost-benefit study is a quantitative
statement of the qualitative judgments of the economist making the
study that preferences are to be maximized and price is a measure of
social value, more or less shared by other economists who make use of
the same Grundnorm or secondary rules.
For example, the authors of one recent cost-benefit study employing new techniques and "control theory" for the first time in such a
study supported their view that the demand for (and thus the price of
and benefits from) wilderness recreation "appear to be increasing" by
noting that "[r]ising education levels . . . seem to be associated with
increasing preferences for taking. . .leisure in a natural environment." 26 Also, they asserted, "The effect of population growth, for
example, given the unchanging preferences and distributionof income
would be to increase the quantity demanded .... ."27 (emphasis
added). They also specified conditions under which price increases
26. Fisher, Krutilla, & Ciecheti, The Economics of Environmental Preservation:A Theoretical
and EmpiricalAnalysis, 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 605 (1972).
27. Id.
at 610.
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(increases in the "value" of such recreation) were likely. In their
study, these authors measured the benefit 2 8 (to society) of one "Visitor
Day" devoted to "Streamside Angling" as equal to $5 and one
"Visitor Day" devoted to "Big Game Hunting" as equal to $25. They
added that ". . . given what is known about prices paid for fishing
and hunting rights where such rights are vested in private parties, we
9
feel our estimates are conservative".2
Two of the authors of the paper had previously been employed by
the Staff of the Federal Power Commission as expert witnesses to
support the Staff's position-in a hydroelectric licensing proceeding
-that the application should be denied. 30 The number of appearances
in this proceeding on behalf of the parties and interveners amounted
to 17. In a well-written statement, listing 122 findings of fact as a basis
for his decision, the Hearing Examiner commented on the cost-benefit
study presented by saying,
• . . The benefit to cost technique is an indispensable tool in
determining the economic feasibility of proposed water resource
projects.
It is not, however, the sole or most important factor in the
ultimate decision. The totality of public benefits and costs cannot
be quantified or measured directly in economic terms despite the
heroic and novel efforts . . to measure mathematically the
value of the river in its present "free flowing state. . . . Preservation is not just an economic question. :3 (emphasisadded).
A cost-benefit study ought to be recognized for what it is, as it was in
this case, a piece of evidence presented by the one side or the other.
In an adjudicative or legislative adversary proceeding, evidence (such
a study) is not a substitute for the proceeding itself.
One economist has argued that contemporary "subjective" legal
procedures for determining liability for accidental death should be
replaced by what he has called a "measurable" economic rule whose
quantification includes as a part of "the value of the marginal life
lost" a sum "equal to the value put upon life by the decedent
himself" 32 (before or after death?). His work has been refined and
corrected by a later writer who has cited Coase's analysis as a basis for
28. Id. at 614-15.
29. Id. at 615.
30. Federal Power Commission, Presiding Examiner's Initial Decision on Demand, Pacific
Northwest Power Project No. 2243 & Washington Public Power Supply System Project No.
2273, February 23, 1971, at 30. [This proceeding was necessary because of the Supreme Court's
decision in Udall v. Federal Power Commission, 387 U.S. 428 (1967)].
31. Id. at 25, 30-31.
32. Rottenberg, Liability in Law and Economics, 55 Am. Econ. Rev. 107, 108 (1965). In this
paper, the author has succeeded in some unspecified way in "Putting to one side [i.e. "aside"]
ethical questions implicit in the compensation principle ....
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this refinement. 33 In both analyses, market prices are employed to
make the relevant valuations.
Judges no longer pretend that they are "discovering the law" (as if
it has been hidden previously under a stone or in the hollow of a tree)
and the mystical philosophy of Blackstone has disappeared from the
bench and the bar. Anyone with an understanding and knowledge
both of the methodologies of law and economics must conclude that
judges and lawyers ought not to allow themselves to be intimidated or
misled by the esoteric form and apparent, but only apparent,
precision with which welfare conclusions asserted by economic
theorists or produced in cost-benefit studies are presented.
The very precision with which they are presented may obscure the
qualitative nature and bases of such conclusions. And these conclusions or judgments are also an inevitable reflection of an analyst's
position concerning the existence of a "relatively absolute absolute",
inexorable "laws" of the universe to which man must conform his
actions, or a presupposed Grundnormor secondary rules.
E. J. Mishan has produced the reductio ad absurdum of cost-benefit
studies purporting to measure "the cost of human life" in his paper,
"Evaluation of Life and Limb: A Theoretical Approach". 34 He has
not only surveyed the existing methods used to evaluate in monetary
terms the values of lives lost-as a result, for example, of disposal of
waste from an atomic power plant, so that this cost may be compared
with the estimated monetary benefit gained from using nuclear
energy-, but he has also noted that the existing measures must be
refined to take account as "social benefits" of such magnitudes as the
value to the ith person of an improved chance of the death of the ith
person, for example "an improved chance of his [the jth person's]
losing some dependent or inheriting some asset-or inheriting it
sooner". 35 The negative of this value must, of course, be included as a
social cost.
It remains to be demonstrated that such studies by economists or
welfare conclusions drawn by economists from general theoretical
analyses are a more effective way of taking into account and calling
attention to the conflicting social interests involved in a lawsuit or in
33. Borcherding, Liability in Law and Economics 60 Am. Econ. Rev. 946 (1970). This author
measures the "marginal social benefit of safety" of air transportation as equal to the sum of the
"individual marginal evaluations;; of the passengers and noncarriers, such as may occur when
planes crash in cities and suburbs. Also, ". . . any passenger will react to disequilibrium by
finding a price-safety package more to his liking."
34. von Mises, supra note 17, at 239-40, 745-56. Mishan, Evaluation of Life and Limb: A
TheoreticalApproach, 79 J. Pol. Econ. 687 (1971).
35. Id. at 700. The relative values of transfers inter vivos are, of course, recognized to be
different from transfers causa mortis, particularly in the case of the decedent.
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a legislative contest than is the current process of reliance on
adversary proceedings. This is not to assert that cost-benefit studies as
"first approximations", econometric studies, or statistical evidence
constitute inadmissible evidence; but it is to say that they must always
be recognized as circumstantial evidence presented by (hostile or
friendly, as the case may be) dedicated, expert, witnesses-subject to
cross examination. It is the role of expert witness which is appropriate
for an economist; but it is not a proper role for an economist to be
accepted as a philosopher king by designating him as a special clerk
and to endow him with an influential role in making of a decision or
in the framing of a decree, views of many economists to the contrary
notwithstanding.
It is clear that economists with natural law or logical positivist
points of view inevitably come to the conclusion in their logical
analyses on the basis of their initial assumptions that an "optimal"
allocation of resources will exist if all consumers are rationally
maximizing the utility (some prefer to call It satisfaction") available
from their given flows of money income per period of time at given
prices, and if all firms in the economy are operating in the long run
under conditions of perfect competition, assuming the distribution of
income is "given". Therefore, once a policy has been adopted or a
decision has been made which leads to such an "optimal" result,
further inquiry into the problem is precluded. The problem has been
solved when the analysis reaches the Grundnorm.
Thus one reads a recommendation that "no public investment [for
example, in highway safety] be deemed 'economic' or 'efficient' if it
fails to yield overall benefits which are at least as great as those which
the same resources would have produced if left in the private
sector. '" 6 The principle seems unexceptionable until one recognizes
that determination of the "overall benefit" may involve estimating
the money value of the addition to total output less the estimated
lifetime consumption of some prospective decendents, plus or minus
various magnitudes of the type identified by Mishan and others
already mentioned, and comparing them with the estimated money
value of the output had the same amount of resources been invested
privately under conditions of perfect competition. And, of course,
much argument has occurred as to the "proper" rate of "social"
discount to be used in the estimates. Thus the market test is the
ultimate solution and no inquiry into the consequences of adopting it
is deemed necessary. To the contrary, such an inquiry lies outside the
36. Joint Econ. Comm., 90th Cong., 2d Sess., Economic Analysis of Public Investment
Decisions: Interest Rate Policy and Discounting Analysis, Report of the Subcomm. on Economy
in Govt. 1 (Joint Comm. Print, 1968).
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scope of "positive economics" and is precluded. Not only Coase and
his followers but also his critics have employed the market test.
An alternative to the points of view discussed above and the one
upon which this paper rests is that of instrumentalism. This point of
view does not preclude further inquiry once the market solution has
been reached. Instead, it emphasizes that the consequences of
adopting any solution must be taken into account.
Instrumentalism originated in the work of C. S. Peirce, was later
expounded and called "pragmatism" by William James, and was
further developed and called "instrumentalism" by John Dewey. 37 In
economics, this philosophical approach permeated the works of
Wesley C. Mitchell (one of the earliest advocates of econometric and
statistical research into economic problems in the United States) and
of John R. Commons (whose work in the areas of public utility
regulation, workmen's compensation, and unemployment insurance
eventually led to the adoption of legislation at the state and federal
levels to deal with the problems to which he pointed). 38
Clarence Ayres employed this point of view to produce a "theory of
economic progress" 39 which anticipated by two decades the theories
of economic development whose generation became fashionable in
economics after World War II. He also presented what he called a
"Technological Theory of Value" 40 as a theoretical basis for economic
analyses taking account of the effects of institutional arrangements
upon economic activity.
Although Coase's paper and contemporary economic theories of
property rights, political democracy, legal liability, and what have
you, pay much lip service to the proposition that "alternative social
arrangements" must be analyzed, all rest on "first principles" or
"anticipation rather than an interrogation of nature". They thereby
employ standards of evaluation-of the kind already discussed-which
are external to, and independent of, the problem being examined. In
making use of such standards, an analyst is precluded from considering all of the relevant alternative social arrangements. Thus, Coase's
analysis and its refinements have proceeded from such a Grundnorm
or secondary rules, and this procedure alone has been sufficient to
guarantee that analyses of the effects of the enforcement of equitable
judicial remedies and their legislative counterparts would be eliminated from consideration by economic theorists.
37. For a further discussion of their works and references, see H. Liebhafsky, American
Government and Business 23 (1971).
38. Id. The Appendix to this book contains a further discussion and references to their works.
39. C. Ayres, The Theory of Economic Progress (1942).
40. C. Ayres, Toward a Reasonable Society 113 (1961).
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The instrumentalist point of view involves rejection of an external
standard of evaluation of solutions to problems or of policies. It
emphasizes instead the method or process of evaluation and that the
standard of evaluation is inherent in the definition of the problem
itself. Such a point of view necessarily involves taking into consideration the consequences of solutions proposed or adopted. The process
of evaluation is one of making self-correcting value judgments to
reach conclusions which are sufficiently reliable to provide a basis for
further action as new problems arise and experience is acquired. The
instrumentalist point of view thus substitutes the process of making a
judgment for the "relatively absolute absolute" as a test.
Clarence Ayres's "Technological Theory of Value" is a case in
point. It can be illustrated with a simple example: Consider the case
of a mechanic faced with the problem of removing a nut from a bolt.
He has no other bolts or nuts and intends to use the nut again when he
has repaired the component of the equipment which is the source of
the trouble. He will search in his tool box until he finds a box wrench
that fits closely and remove the nut. He learns from his mistakes.
Indeed, he may have to try several box wrenches to see which fits
best. He could save time by using a pipe wrench which is close at
hand. But if he did use it, he might "chew up" the nut so that it could
never be used again. He has had such an experience on a prior
occasion; so his knowledge is based on experience; and in the process
of determining by experience which wrench to use he gains more
knowledge. Once he has removed the nut from the bolt with the
proper-sized wrench, the wrench that fits, he is in a position to take
further action on the troublesome component. And by the time he has
repaired this particular piece of equipment, another customer may
have brought in another piece of equipment to be repaired-this time
of a later model, perhaps, since technological changes (the combination and recombination of things, and of ideas) do occur in the world
in which we happen to live. The test concerning which box wrench to
use is inherent in the problem of repairing the equipment in a
situation in which no replacement nut is available.
To ask why we are here, what is the ultimate objective of our being
alive is fruitless. But when a problem arises or is perceived, the
process of self-correcting value judgments, the experimental methods,
seems to be the one which has been instrumentally validated by the
very process of experience in time.
An individual on being invited to have a second martini at lunch
may refuse the invitation if he has an important conference scheduled
for later in the day if his experience in the past from having two at
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noon have provided him with the knowledge that having two makes
him less alert later in the day. Values are thus subject to instrumental
validation and analysis. Or to quote from one of Ayres's works:
It is in this, the life process of mankind, that values arise. To
recognize this fact is not to say that "nature intends" the
development of human culture. Nature does not intend anything.
Intention is an aspect of human behavior. But it does mean that
the value judgments which emerge from this process have a basis
in fact. When we judge a thing to be good or bad, or an action to
be right or wrong, what we mean is that, in our opinion, the thing
or act in question will, or will not, serve to advance the life
process insofar as we can envision it." 41
Ayres pointed out that "taking the life of another is regarded as an
offense by all peoples"-although "what one society regards as
justifiable homicide another regards as murder". The reason is that
the proposition "Thou shalt not kill" (regarded as a mere wish by
logical positivists) is a functional rule: (1) not only is the taking of life
disruptive of social order; but (2) the life taken cannot be returned
-the consequence of this act producing the loss of life is irreversible.
Genuine universal values thus have a functional, factual basis. 42
The same sort of reasoning is applicable to many forms of pollution
activity. Aside from the question of loss of life which cannot be
restored, the question exists-and it can be answered only by physical
scientists having access to the relevant tools and skills-are there some
forms of pollution which cannot be reversed? It is possible that
disposal of atomic waste at random throughout the land may be the
cheapest way to dispose of such waste if prices only are used as a
measure of social value, but are there possible, as yet unknown,
genetic effects on all forms of life if such actions are uncritically
accepted because they are justified in the name of maximization of
the unspecified preferences for goods only of assumed individuals in
hypothetical situations.?
But if it is admitted that social control either in the form of
legislation or judicial action is to be exercised in cases of disposal of
radioactive substances, the principle advanced by Coase and others
-that whether or not the market value under perfect competition of
the output gained exceeds the market value of the output lost is the
decisive measure of "social value", and therefore provided a universal
ratio decidendi-has been breached. Then the problem becomes one
for judgment by responsible men of the significance of the competing
social interests involved, in the face of strong advocacy of reasons for
41. Id.

42. Id. at 157.
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favoring one party or another in the light of available evidence
concerning probable consequnces of deciding one way or another. A
process of selecting a box wrench that fits is thus substituted for a
belief that relationships among men are governed by some "relatively
absolute absolute" or should be governed by a presupposed Grundnorm such as Pareto optimality.
Or to put the matter another way, is the heritage of future
generations to be a polluted planet justified by reliance on the
concept of Pareto optimality and increasing consumption or perhaps
poetically by an appropriate modification of Edna St. Vincent
Millay's lines so that they read, "If we burn our candles at both ends
it really will make a lovely light."? Of course, she did add, "It will not
last the night".
The instrumentalist emphasis in economics upon consideration of
consequences of policies adopted, and upon a process of self-correcting value judgments to determine which box wrench fits the nut
involves looking away from "first principles" and from "verbal
solutions to hypothetical problems" and looking towards concrete
questions involving difficult decisions. It is analogous to the judicial
process of allowing the content of general rules to be determined on a
cased-by-case basis as experience grows and changes occur. The
alternative is to begin with a Grundnorm or a "relatively absolute
absolute" and make use of a standard of evaluation external to the
problem. Pareto optimality is such an external standard, a standard
which contains an economist's version of a rule against perpetuities
43
even stricter than the one announced in the Duke of Norfolk's Case.
In economics, the preferences we maximize are all preferences of
lives in being; were they not, it would be impossible to indulge in an
economic fiction that preferences are discoverable "in principle" (i.e.
are quasi-discoverable). It is thus beside the point to assert that the
interest rate measures the preferences for current and future consumption of present lives in being.
Mishan has concluded his scholarly 1971 essay on externalities with
an "Epilogue" which opens with what is prima facie an almost
apologetic statement that the last portions of his essay "do not lend
themselves easily to analytical elegance 4 4 -which really means that
they are excluded from traditional analysis because they cannot easily
be stated quantitatively-but he has then taken the offensive and
asserted correctly that the points he has made "with respect to
environmental spillover-the most urgent problem of our fragile
43. 3 Ch. Cas. 1; Tiffany, Real Property 265 (Abridged ed. 1940).
44. Mishan, The Postwar Literature on Externalities: An Interpretive Essay, 9 J. Econ. Lit. 1
(1971)
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are more pertinent than those arising from tradi-

tional allocation analysis". 45 He has added in a further statement that
it is not hard to understand the "exaggerated weight" given to
problems of allocation by economic theorists because these aspects of
economic problems "lend themselves nicely to formal theorizing and,
with patience and a little finesse, impressive measures of social losses
and gains can be foisted on credulous civil servants and a gullible
public".

46

It is also worth pointing out in this context that Baumol has
paradoxically concluded his mathematical analysis-of a case of a firm
whose smoke emission injures other firms only-by recommending an
approach "more for its promise of effectiveness, than its theoretical
nicety". 47 He has done so because of the great problems involved in
actually quantifying (measuring) the concepts stated quantitatively (in
a precise mathematical form) in his equations. Since actual measurement of the quantitatively-stated concepts in his mathematical
analysis is admittedly not possible, Baumol has also remarked that the
adoption of a tax scheme to enforce minimum standards of acceptability in pollution problems may be the best solution even if an optimal
allocation is not achieved and added that, "It may be that with time
we can learn to improve the workings of a set of standards of
acceptability. .

.

.Successive modifications in the criteria based on

experience and revaluation may produce results that on the whole are
not too bad." 48 Thus, although he had begun with the standard of
Pareto optimality, Baumol eventually abandoned his "relatively
absolute absolute" and, in substance though not form, adopted the
Instrumentalist solution of a process of self-correcting value judgments obtained from the definition of the problem itself. (He did, of
course, first produce a mathematical demonstration that "successive
iteration" could lead to an optimum position.)
The counterpart in jurisprudence of instrumentalism in economics
is the philosophy expressed in Holmes's widely-quoted statement:
"The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. ...
The law embodies the story of a nation's development through many
centuries, and cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms
and corollaries of a book of mathematics." 49 In our own time,
Wolfgang Friedman's conception of "Law as an Instrument of Social
Order" is also a counterpart. Thus Friedmann wrote:
45. Id.at 26.

46. Mishan, supra note 44, at 26.
47. Baumol, supra note 17, at 307.

48. Id.
49. 0. Holnes Jr., The Common Law 1 (1881).
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That the content of the rule of law cannot be determined for all
time and circumstances is a matter not for lament but for
rejoicing. It would be tragic if the law were so petrified as to be
unable to respond to the unending
challenges of evolutionary or
50
revolutionary changes in society.
The Coase analysis and its refinements would limit the responses of
courts and legislatures to responses to changes in assumed preferences
for goods only, as reflected in relative prices under hypothetical
conditions of perfect competition, with the preferences determinable
"in principle".
A thorough search of the literature has failed to reveal that any
economist has yet produced the preference (or utility) function of any
life in being, including his own. Thus far in economics we have been
able only to postulate a theory of "Revealed Preference". Its basic
axiom is that the particular market basket of goods actually purchased
by a rational consumer with his given money income at given market
prices, when it was also open to him to purchase one or more other
market baskets of goods, must have been the one he preferred to buy.
Otherwise he would not have been the rational consumer we assumed
him to be.
Nor for that matter, has anyone yet produced an empirical
counterpart of a demand curve as this concept is defined in economic
theory. It is, of course, always difficult to find the exact real world
counterpart of a hypothetical or imaginary function or entity.
Legislative action, legal methodology, and the judicial process-for
example, the refusal of the Supreme Court to render gratuitous
opinions by observing generally the informal rules 5 1 of constitutional
interpretation developed as a result of experience since Justice
Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison52-and the established
judicial practice of allowing the specific content of general rules to be
determined in the course of time as experience grows and changes in
our society, are clearly instrumental processes, a point I have
mentioned above but now repeat for emphasis.
Upon careful analysis, many of the criticisms by economists of the
courts and the law can be demonstrated to be disagreements about
the finding of fact made in the case in question, whether that finding
was made by a jury or by a judge. But responsible men can almost
always disagree about how to interpret evidence, particularly if it is
circumstantial. And yet, the critics often think they are criticizing the
50. W. Friedmann, Law in a Changing Society 503 (1959).
51. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
52. 1 Cranch 137 (1803)
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law. Moreover, in such criticisms, they often make use of much
extra-record evidence, most of which would be inadmissible, and
assume that our federal appellate courts, in general, normally review
de novo findings of fact made by administrative agencies and courts of
the first instance.
And, as many writings by economists attest, economists have also
generally failed to understand either the functional nature of an
adversary proceeding or of the judicial process. The latter has been
clearly described by Fiedmann in these words:
The task of the modern judge is increasingly complex. Hardly
any major decision can be made without a careful evaluation
of.

.

. conflicting values and interests.

.

. Totalitarian govern-

ment eliminates much of the conflict by dictating what should be
done. [And so would uncritical reliance upon a "relatively
absolute Absolute".]
The lot of the democratic judge is heavier and nobler. He
cannot escape the burden of individual responsibility, and great,
as distinct from competent, judges have, I submit, been those who
have shouldered that burden and made their decisions as articulate a reflection of the conflicts before them as possible. 5:1
And to this statement one might add, "And who have articulated also
the reasons and considerations which have led them to resolve the
conflict of one set of values and interests rather than another in the
face of strong advocacy that they take the reverse position."
Such views are, however, rejected by economists who accept the
Coase position. The position is clear: not only must this view of the
law be abandoned, but so must the view of Holmes be disregarded
that "the life of the law has . . .been experience". Instead, the view
he rejected must be adopted by dealing with the law "as if it
contained only the axioms and corrolaries of a book of mathematics";
provided however, that the axioms shall be those laid down by the
economists taking this position. Thus, logical positivism in economics
and reliance upon a "relatively absolute absolute" go beyond the
legal positivism of Kelsen and the analytical jurisprudence of Hart by
undertaking to acquire by adverse possession title to, and specifying
the content of, the Grundnonn and the secondary rules assumed by
Hart and Kelsen as a starting point for their legal analyses. In the
view of these economists, a new home must be found in environmental law for the concept of "substantive due process" in matters of
economic regulation abandoned by the Supreme Court nearly forty
years ago. 54
53. Friedmann, supra note 50, at 67.
54. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502.
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In his 1969 presidential address to the American Economic
Association already mentioned, Kenneth Boulding cited "The economy theory of democracy developed by Anthony Downs" as an
example "of 'economic imperialism , which is an attempt on the part
of economics to take over all the other social sciences".5 5 Boulding
might well have cited also the Coase theorum and its issue as an
attempt on the part of economists to take over the law.
But questions remain to be asked; and a consideration of the result
in Coase's analysis when an equitable remedy is enforced-the case he
eliminated from consideration--demands attention.
Economics contains many terms of art. The statement of the
definition of some of these requires considerably more space than
others. In what follows for the benefit of readers who are not
economists, I will place such longer definitions in footnotes and
incorporate only the very short one in the text itself. Footnote 22
supra containing the definition of perfect competition, a purely
analytical category which does not describe a state of affairs existing
in the real world, is an example.
AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF
COASE'S ARGUMENT AND AN ALTERNATIVE
George Stigler has stated the Coase theorum in these words:
... The Coase theorum thus states that under perfect competition
private and social cost will be equal. 56 Private costs are the costs
incurred by firms or individuals engaged in an activity. Social costs
are the costs to society of the activity, including any harmful effects
inflicted upon others by such firms or individuals as a result of their
engaging in such activity. In the Coase theorum literature, the costs of
such harmful effects are also called externalities. 5 7 The definition of
perfect competition and that this term of art specifies an analytical
category and not a real world condition have already been stated in
footnote 22 supra.
Calabresi has provided a refined version of the Coase theorum
which states
. ..as an axiom the proposition that all externalities can be
internalized and all misallocations [of resources], even those
created by legal structures, can be remedied by the market, except
to the extent that transactions cost money and the legal structure
55. Boulding, supra note 21, at 8.
56. G. Stigler, The Theory of Price 113 (1966).
57. In economics generally, the word externalities may refer either to harm inflicted or to
benefits conferred upon others as specified by the author, but in the Coase theorem literature
the word invariably means harmful effects.
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itself creates some impediments to bargaining. [Provided however,
that the definition is accepted that]. . .there exists a misallocation
when a situation can be improved by bargains. 58
And provided further that the hypothetical bargaining parties behave
rationally to maximize their self-interests under perfect competition.
I have already mentioned that Coase has produced his conclusions
by analyzing an arithmetical example of a hypothetical case involving
damage to a farmer's crop by a neighboring rancher's "inevitably"
straying steers in two different legal situations and comparing the
results. He has tacitly assumed that no fence law exists within the
jurisdiction and asserted:
• ..If
it is inevitable that some cattle will stray, an increase in the
supply of meat can be obtained only at the expense of a decrease
in the supply of crops. The nature of the choice is clear: meat or
crops.59
However despite his frequent assertions that "When an economist
is comparing alternative social arrangements, the proper procedure is
to compare the total social product yielded by these different
arrangements,- 60 Coase has restricted his analysis of his farmerrancher case to an analysis of two only of the possible legal situations encompassed within his example. That is, he has analyzed only:
(1) the case in which liability for compensatory damages only exists
-with the value of the crops destroyed measured at the current
market price; and (2) the case in which no liability for monetary
damage exists. Doing so effectively deletes the word if with which the
quotation above opens. He has failed-as have other writers discussing
and refining his work-to consider the case of actual enforcement of
an equitable remedy to restrain the rancher from conducting his
ranching activities "in such manner" as to inflict damage upon the
farmer.
Coase's hypothetical example and analysis assume not incidental,
occasional, straying by the steers, but that the straying will continue
even after the farmer "abandons cultivation". Indeed, in Coase's
analysis, the rancher would not allow the "straying" and the resulting
crop damage to occur were it not in his own self-interest (In the form
of an increased income) to do so. Nor does a case of environmental
pollution, in general, involve occasional, sporadic, infrequent, emis58. Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules-A Comment, 9 J.
Law & Econ. 67, 68 (1968). Eventually, like Baumol, Calabresi produced an instrumentalist
solution-in desperation.
59. Coase, supra note 1, at 2.
60. Id. at 34.
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sion by the firm engaged in the activity whose effects produce the
pollution if a gain is to be had.
And, having limited his analysis to cases in which the straying is,
indeed, "inevitable", the clarity with which Coase has been able to
see the mutually exclusive choices of meat or crops is inevitable as the
"inevitable" straying, which is inevitable only if no equitable remedy
is enforced. Thus he has not analyzed a case analogous to one of
enforcement of an abatement regulation.
At a later point in his paper, Coase has discussed a few reported
decisions in cases involving injunctions but he has applied directly his
reasoning based upon his hypothetical case of an award of monetary
damages, thereby substituting his model for reality. Thus, he has
asserted at the outset of his later discussion of several cases involving
injunctions, ". . .although it may have appeared to be a rather
special case it [the farmer-rancher case] is, in fact but one example of
a problem which arises in many different guises."6 1 In discussing one
of these cases-in which an injunction was granted-he has said, "The
basic conditions are exactly the same as they were in the example of
cattle which destroyed crops." 6 2 In discussing another case in which
the damage remedy was held adequate, he has repeated substantially
the preceding quotation and asserted that the situation in the case in
which the damage remedy was held adequate "is essentially the same
as it was" in the case in which the injunction was granted.6 3 Thus he
has stated his general view: ". . .situations which are from the
economic point of view identical will be treated differently by the
courts. The economic problem in all cases of harmful effects is to
64
maximize the [money] value of production."
If Coase's view were correct, some equitable remedies might never
have been developed to deal with situations in which "the damage
remedy is inadequate" to provide that flexibility which the law must
possess if it is, indeed, to serve as "an instrument of social order".
Coase has failed to understand-as have other economists accepting
his arguments-the difference between the effect on total output of
enforcement of an equitable remedy which reduces or eliminates
continuing harm-but not necessarily the activity whose effects
produce that harm-and that of an award for monetary damages for
past harm which leaves the future harm to continue, as does Coase's
laissez-faire solution (the existence of a rule of nonliability for
61.
62.
63.
64.

id. at 8.
Id.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 15.
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compensatory damages). Even if, under Coase's assumptions, the
allocation of resources is, in general, the same in the two legal
situations he has discussed, enforcement of an equitable remedy must
produce different total product mix and may produce a larger one. In
the case of the specific arithmetical example he has used to illustrate
his argument, enforcement of an equitable remedy does result in a
greater total social product than do either his liability or nonliability
(laissez-faire)situation.
The validity of the preceding points can be demonstrated by
previewing Coase's argument and comparing the results produced by
means of his arithmetical example of the farmer-rancher case in his
cases of liability and laissez-faire with the result produced when an
equitable remedy is enforced.
In this example, not only has Coase assumed that price is a measure
of social value, that the farmer and the rancher are both operating
under conditions of perfect competition on neighboring properties,
and that no fence law exists, but also he has restricted his analysis to
the case of one farmer and rancher only, so that the problem of
straying steers is not an industry-wide problem.6 5 I will accept these
assumptions for the sake of argument.
Table 1 contains a reproduction of Coase's arithmetical representation of the relationship between the number of steers in the rancher's
herd and the crop loss or damage suffered by the farmer as a result of
the "inevitable" straying of the steers.

Number in Herd

Table 1
TDC
Annual Crop Loss

MDC
Crop Loss per Additional

(Steers)

(Tons)

Steer (Tons)

1
2
3
4

1
3
6
10

1
2
3
4

65. Id.at 4. Coase has said:
Of course, if cattle raising commonly involved the destruction of crops, the
coming into existence of the cattle-raising industry might raise the price of crops
and farmers would extend their planting. But I wish to confine my attention to
the individual farmer.
That the crop destruction cannot increase the price of crops is, of course, essential to Coase's
argument, He has failed to point out that if such a price increase occurred the damage cost
would increase even if there were no increase in the quantity planted and that even in the pure
world of economic theory it is unlikely that an increase in the quantity planted will result in an
increase in sprouted and growing-crops (corporeal heriditaments) instanter. As pointed out in
the text earlier, Coase has frequently asserted that his analysis has general application, whatever
may be the legal policy issues raised in various other cases.
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The third column labeled, "Loss per Additional Steer", is the
marginal damage cost (MDC), the addition to the total damage cost
per additional steer; and the total damage cost (TDC) in the second
column is thus simply the sum of the numbers in the third column
from 1 for the relevant numbers of steers assumed produced.
Coase has not provided any information concerning any other costs
of production of the steers. He has, however, assumed that the annual
cost of fencing is $9 and that the market price of the crop is $1 per
ton. He has then noted that if the rancher is liable for the damage
caused by his steers, he must add the total and marginal damage costs
to his other costs (as appropriate) in deciding what size herd to
produce or in deciding to make changes in the size of the herd. Rather
than to produce four steers and pay a total damage cost of $10, he
would build the fence for $9.66
Since Coase has assumed perfect competition both in ranching and
in farming, he has assumed that neither party can affect the price of
the output by the amount he sells.6 71 Each takes the market price as
given and adjusts his output and thereby his costs to the given price
by producing that quantity of output at which the addition to his total
revenue from selling an additional steer (marginal revenue) is just
equal to the addition to his total cost (marginal cost).
Economists specify that a firm is in a short-run equilibrium position
when it is selling a quantity such that the addition to the firm's total
cost (its marginal cost) is equal to the addition to its total revenue
from selling an additional unit of output (its marginal revenue)
provided that the increase in total cost from selling more units than
this quantity exceeds the increase in total revenue. When a firm is in
such a position, it has no incentive to increase its output from its
existing capacity. (What is produced is assumed to be sold.) Under
perfect competition, since the amount sold by the individual firm does
not affect the price, the addition to total revenue from selling an
additional unit of output (the marginal revenue) is simply equal to the
price, the amount received from selling that unit.
It must also be noted that economists define total cost differently
than do accountants. An economist includes in the total cost of the
firm an amount equal to the "opportunity cost" 68 of all of the inputs
66. Id. at 3.
67. See note 22 supra.
68. From the point of view of the individual firm, opportunity cost is defined as the income
foregone by a firm as a result of using inputs which it owns in one way rather than in another.
Thus, a firm which invests its own capital in an expansion of its facilities foregoes the income
which that capital would earn if invested in its next most profitable use.
From the point of view of society, opportunity cost is defined as the output which would be
foregone if the input were devoted to its "next best use." The amount foregone is usually
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owned by the firm itself. In addition, an economist includes in the
concept of the total cost a "normal profit," defined in a rather circular
way as the amount of profit earned by the marginal (borderline) firm
when the industry is in a long-run equilibrium position (to be defined
shortly).
The objective of the firm is then assumed to be maximization of its
net revenue or its economic profit (its "greater than normal profit")
defined, in turn as the difference between total revenue and total cost
(which includes the "normal profit"). For our purposes, it is enough to
remark that, if the price of the product is greater than its average cost
(including any relevant average damage cost), the firm must by
definition be earning a greater than normal profit (or a positive net
revenue or an economic profit).
Such a greater than normal profit can, however, by definition and
assumption, be earned under perfect competition in the short run
only. That is, such profit is rationalized as a functional return, since its
existence results in the expansion of existing capacity or entry of new
firms into the industry-actions which increase the supply of the
product forcing its price down. Eventually the point is reached at
which the firm and industry are in a position of long-run equilibrium.
In this postion, there is no reason nor incentive for any firm either to
change the output from its existing capacity nor for the capacity of
the industry (size of existing plants or numbers of plants) to change.
Such a position is attained under perfect competition when the price
of the product is equal to both the marginal and average costs of the
marginal (borderline) firm which is thus earning a normal profit only.
Any return above the normal profit made by the marginal firm which
is being received by an infra-marginal firm-one whose total cost
assumed to be measurable "in principle" in units of output or in the money value of the output
foregone.
This concept, of course, plays a crucial role in Coase's argument. He has emphasized
throughout his paper that "a receipt foregone is the equivalent of payment of the same amount"
Coase supra, note 1, at 7. This statement is, however, misleading, since the "opportunity cost"
concept is merely a device employed by economists to account for a part of the total revenue
received by the firm. In the long run, the "receipt foregone" by the firm must be offset by an
income received from some other source, the source being the one which benefits from the
alternative use of the input. In other words, in the long run, the price paid by consumers for a
good includes the "opportunity cost" along with all other costs of production of the firm.
However, in general since the firm owns the input to which the "opportunity cost" is
attributable, this portion of the price paid by consumers is not paid out to others by the firm.
This "functional" justification for the inclusion of "opportunity cost" in a firm's total cost
approaches an ethical justification since it rests on an assumption that the firm has title to the
input in question. If the firm does not own the input in question, but an "opportunity cost"
equal to a bribe foregone not to destroy the property of another is included in the firm's
"opportunity cost," the concept degenerates into a naked rationalization of the particular social
arrangement which results in a receipt by the firm of an income equal to the "bribe foregone" in
not refraining from the use of property to which it has no title.
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(including the normal profit) is less than its total revenue-is then
identified as an "opportunity cost" 6 9 or as "rent" necessary to retain
the firm in the industry. This sum is then added to the total cost of the
firm so that its total cost plus rent or plus "opportunity cost" and its
and the firm is then specified as earning
total revenue are made equal;
70
normal profits only also.
Coase has analyzed the example given in Table 1 and demonstrated
that whether or not liability for compensatory damages exists, the
allocation of resources to ranching will be the same. He has first
discussed the case in which liability for damage exists and concluded
that a rational profit-maximizing rancher will take into account both
the total and marginal damage cost and produce a level of output
such that the marginal revenue (the price under perfect competition)
is equal to the sum of the marginal damage cost and the marginal
costs of the resources owned or purchased by the rancher required to
produce the marginal unit of output. 71 I shall call the marginal costs of
these resources the marginal resource costs (MRC) to distinguish them
from the marginal damage costs (MDC) or Loss per Additional Steer
in Table 1) assumed by Coase. Thus, the marginal total cost is equal to
the sum of the marginal damage cost and the marginal resource cost.
Coase has not assumed any arithmetical values for the marginal
resource cost nor the price of steers in his example. But it must be
noted that since-under perfect competition-equilibrium can exist
only when the marginal total cost is equal to the price of the output
and since Coase has specified the marginal damage cost in his
example, once a price has been given the marginal resource cost for
the assumed equilibrium level of output is determined as a residual
equal to price minus marginal damage cost. And also, once the
marginal resource cost has been determined for the equilibrium level
69. Stigler has asserted:
The surplus of earnings over what can be earned in the best alternative is called
a rent. As the name suggests, economists first attached this concept of returns
beyond those needed to hold a resource only to land. [Sic.] The concept has since
been generalized to include such returns even when received by laborers or
owners of specific goods. (emphasis in the original) Stigler, supra note 56, at 106,
n.2.
70. If, at the same time, all other industries in the economy are also in a position of long-run
equilibrium so that normal profits only are being earned in them also; and if all consumers in the
economy are rationally maximizing the total utility of the goods and services obtainable from
their given flows of money income at the given prices, the economy is in a state of general
equilibrium. The value of every variable in the system is"determined." No reason for any
change exists within the envisioned system. Such a system satisfies the condition of Pareto
optimality: "no one can be made better off without making someone else worse off." The
wagons have been formed into a perfect circle. The logic is impeccable. The full meaning has
been drained from the initial assumptions made.
71. See note 22 supra.
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of output, the price must be equal to the sum of that marginal
resource cost plus the corresponding marginal damage cost, or to the
marginal total cost.
In Table 2 below, I have assumed a marginal resource cost function
(MRC) which falls to a minimum point and then rises-in keeping
with the stylized function assumed traditionally in price theory. (See
Column 4 of Table 2.)
In his farmer-rancher case, Coase has concerned himself with a
discussion of the effects on cost of an increase in the number of steers
(a variable) raised on a fixed quantity of farm and ranch land. The
case is thus one involving changes in output from existing capacity.
The number of steers, their feed, water, care, etc. are variable inputs;
hoof" (an
in Coase's arithmetical example, the output is "meat on the
72
consumption).
final
for
ready
yet
not
output
intermediate
His example involves changes in output of steers from existing
capacity, since he has nowhere considered the effect of a de facto
increase in the total quantity of land used to raise steers nor has he
spoken of changes in the size of the ranching industry, since he has
73
limited his analysis to the case of one farmer and one rancher only.
He has allowed the quantity of cropland to change.
At various points in Coase's paper there is obscurity as to his
assumptions. Buchanan 7 4 has emphasized that Coase's analysis involves beginning from a position of "disequilibrium"; such a procedure is unusual in economic analysis. Wellisz 75 has also been troubled
by the obscurity of some of Coase's assumptions and concluded that
Table 2
(Without fence, F = $1; with $9 fence, F = $10 and asterisk * indicates relevant values.)
(1)
OUTPUT

I
2
3
4
5
6
7

(2)
MDC

1
2
3
4
2
0
0

0*
9*
0*
0*
0*
0:
0*

(3)
TDC

(4)
MRC

(5)
TVC

1 0*
3 0*
6 0*
10 0*
12 0*
12 0*
12 0*

6
4
6
8
10
12
14

6
10
16
24
34
46
60

(6)
MTC=
MRC+
MDC

7
6
9
12
12
12
14

6*
4*
6*
8*
10*
12*
14*

(7)
TDC=
TVC +
TDC
+F
8
14
23
35
47
59
73

16*
20*
26*
34*
44*
56*
70*

(8)
P=9

(9)
R

9
9
9
9
9
9
9

9
18
27
36
45
54
63

(10)
N

1
4
4
1
-2
.5
-10

-7*
-2*
1*
2*
2*
-2*
-7*

72. Whether the rancher eventually butchers the meat on the hoof himself or sells it is
irrelevant. For purposes of argument only, I am granting Coase's necessary implicit assumption
that the steers are homogeneous, although I have never seen such a herd.
73. See note 65 supra.
74. Buchanan & Tullock, supra note 16, at 347 n. 2.
75. S. Wellisz, On External Economies and the Government-Assisted Invisible Hand, 31
Economica 345, 350, 351 (1964).
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since, under perfect competition, "every firm operates at a zero profit
level"-meaning thereby that in the long run, firms operate at a
normal profit level-the "net gain" Coase has assumed his firms to be
earning must be interpreted as economic rent.
For our present purposes, economic rent may be defined simply as a
greater than normal profit earned by a firm which owns an input
(land) whose supply cannot be increased in response to price changes,
as input which is not available to new firms wishing to compete away
the resulting greater than normal profits. As the price of the product
produced rises, the demand for the scarce input and the return to it
accordingly rise. Since the supply of the input earning the economic
rent cannot be increased, economic rent does not perform the
function of a true greater than normal profit-that of inducing
expansion of capacity. Thus, rather than being a case of short-run
equilibrium within which the "net gains" are greater than normal
profits whose function is to induce increases in capacity, Coase's
farmer-rancher example involves a case of economic rent, a functionless surplus enjoyed by the owner of a scarce resource. Coase's
analysis involves rent at the "intensive margin" only. The "intensive
margin" involves a de facto fixed quantity of land (a concept
equivalent to a given size plant) and hence a case of given capacity.
Some writers, particularly those seeking to rationalize laissez-faire,
argue that the receipt of economic rent-the return received by the
owner of a resource whose supply cannot be increased-can be
justified by reliance on the "opportunity cost concept". However,
their conclusion that the economic rent will be greatest when the
resources are "efficiently allocated" is an explanation of the level of
rent and not a demonstration that its payment to the owner of such a
resource performs an economic function. It is well-established in
economic theory that a "lump sum tax"-a tax whose magnitude is
independent of changes in output-imposed upon the recipient of
economic rent will leave the allocation of resources unaffected, not
only under perfect competition but irrespective of the degree of
competition. 76 If the economic rent or surplus can be extracted by
means of such a lump sum tax without affecting the allocation of
resources, what function does receipt by the owner of the resource of
this surplus perform? The economic theorist concept of economic
rent is not the same thing as nominal rent in the real world. The latter
may include elements of interest and wages also. Actual measurement
of economic rent, like that of many other magnitudes of price theory,
is generally possible "in principle" only.
76.

A graphical explanation can be found in H. Liebhafsky, The Nature of Price Theory 482

(Revised ed., 1968).
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In general, a firm's total cost will consist of fixed costs (F)- defined
as costs which are independent of the level of output-and variable
costs, costs which do vary as output varies. Property taxes are an
example of a fixed cost. In Table 2, I have assumed that, if no fence is
built, the rancher's fixed cost is $1, or F = $1. Since Coase has
assumed that the "annual cost of building and maintaining a fence is
$9, if the rancher did build such a fence, his fixed cost would increase
to $1 + $9 = $10. the numbers without asterisks in Table 2 apply if
no fence is built and F = $1; the numbers with asterisks apply if a $9
fence is built so that F = $10.
The total variable cost (TVC) is given in column (5) of Table 2 and
does vary as output varies. In column (5) total variable cost is
computed as equal to the sum of the marginal resource costs in
column (4)-(the sum of the additions to the resource cost as output
increases) at each level of output. This total variable cost function is
thus consistent with Coase's procedure and assumptions.
The first three columns of Table 2 merely reproduce Coase's
assumed damage-output relations already given in Table 1. Coase has
not specified the maximum number of steers which the rancher can
raise and I have extended Coase's damage-output relationship in the
logical way. He has specified that the size of the farmer's crop is 12
tons, that the marginal damage cost is equal to the number of steers
produced, and that four steers will destroy ten tons of crops.
Therefore, addition of the fifth steer can result in only two tons of
crop damage rather than in five tons. Once the crop has been totally
destroyed by five steers, addition of the sixth and seventh steers can
result in no further crop destruction, so the marginal damage cost in
these cases is zero. Moreover once the total crop of 12 tons has been
destroyed by five steers, the total damage cost is a constant equal to 12
tons. I will discuss later the relationship between the size of the herd
and the cost of the fence.
Coase has discussed in detail a situation in which the rancher is
assumed to be in equilibrium producing three steers.77 Comparison of
the cases of liability and nonliability and of a case he does not
discuss-that of use of an equitable remedy-can be most forcefully
presented by means of a simple diagram.
Consider Figure 1. In this diagram the upward sloping line
consisting of dots and dashes represents Coase's Marginal Damage
Cost function, the data reproduced in columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.
Although Coase's example assumes a "discrete" case-one in which
output is not continously variable, for visual clarity I have drawn the
line in the traditional way to represent an output which is continuous77. Coase, supra note 1, at 2-8.
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ly variabl e; this assumption is harmless insofar as my conclusions and
analysis are concerned; indeed, it produces a more general analysis.
At point A, for example, when three units of output are being
produced, the marginal damage cost is equal to $3 in Figure I and in
Table 2. The inverted L-shaped solid line labeled "MRC without
Damage" is a picture of the marginal resource cost function. It
represents the data contained in column (4) of Table 2.
As noted earlier, Coase has argued that if liability for damage
exists, the rancher must take account of the marginal damage cost in
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addition to his other costs in determining the size of the herd to be
produced at the given market price. In Figure 1, the inverted
L-shaped dashed line labeled "MRC + Damage . . ." represents the
sum of the marginal damage cost and the marginal resource cost at
each level of output; it is a picture of the relationship expressed by
the numbers contained in column (6) of Table 2. I have already
defined the sum of these two magnitudes as the marginal total cost.
Now consider the case in which 3 steers are being produced "in
equilibrium" by the rancher. Reference to column (6), Table 2,
discloses that the sum of the marginal damage cost and the marginal
resource cost when three steers are being produced is $9. As has been
noted, under perfect competition the marginal revenue is equal to the
price. And if the rancher is in equilibrium, the marginal total cost
must be equal to the marginal revenue and thus to the price.
Therefore, the market price of steers, when three steers are being
produced must also be $9. This assumption-inherent in the others
already made-is depicted in Figure 1 by the horizontal line labeled
dd. This line represents the demand curve "facing the rancher." The
price (P) is a constant and is not affected by the amount the rancher
sells; moreover, the addition to his total revenue from selling an
additional steer, or his marginal revenue (MR) is simply equal to the
amount of money he receives for that steer, the constant price. His
total revenue is defined as equal to the number of steers sold
multiplied by that price and is found in Column (9) of Table 2. His
average revenue (AR) is the same as his price. The dd line in Figure 1
represents the price, the marginal revenue, and the average revenue
all of which are equal and constant.
Simple inspection of the picture drawn in Figure 1 shows that the
MRC + Damage line-the dashed line-intersects the horizontal P =
MR = AR solid line at the point labeled ED, at which both the price
and the marginal total cost (or the MRC + Damage) are equal to $9
on the vertical axis and the number of steers produced is 3 (XD) on
the horizontal axis.
At this level of output, the rancher's total revenue (R) is thus (3)
($9) , $27. His total cost at this level of output is equal to the sum of
the total variable cost, the total damage cost, and the fixed cost (of
$1), as given in column (7) of Table 2. Column (7) is, of course, merely
the sum of columns (3) and (5) plus $1, the amount of the fixed cost, if
no fence is built; if the fence is built the numbers with asterisks apply.
The difference between the rancher's total revenue and his total cost,
absent the fence, is thus $27 - $23 = $4 (his "net gain" N in Coase's
terminology) at this level of output in column (10) of Table 2. This
"net gain" (N) is his economic rent.
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Coase has further assumed that the farmer produces 12 tons of crop
at a price of $1 per ton and has total costs of $10. Thus he has assumed
the farmer's "net gain" or economic rent as equal to $2 if no damage
occurs.

78

With liability for damage, six tons of crop are destroyed, but the
rancher reimburses the farmer at the current market price-exemplary damages are ruled out by assumption- for the damage done.
Thus the farmer is, in effect, "made whole" while having been
required to engage in a continuing "forced sales" to the rancher. With
damage and liability, the farmer's total revenue thus is $12; his costs
are $10, and his "net gain" is equal to $2 as before. The rancher,
having included the damage cost in his calculations, produces three
steers and has a "net gain" of $4. He has merely served as a transfer
agent, passing on to the farmer the amount consumers pay to him for
the damage. Society thus has available for consumption three steers
plus six tons of crops. The "opportunity cost" to society of three steers
is the value "elsewhere' 79 of the resources used on the ranch plus the
value of six tons of crops destroyed, and the consumers have paid $6
for this crop destruction; the rule of liability has insured that the
farmer be reimbursed for the damage he has incurred and for which
consumers have paid.
The legal theory can be one of trespass, intentional nuisance, or
negligent nuisance. Since it is not assumed that the cattle eat the
crops and gain weight in the process, no question of unjust enrichment is involved in this sense.
Coase has thus postulated a case involving continuing prospective
injury to the farmer, but few lawyers would consider repeated actions
for compensatory damages to be an appropriate remedy in such a
case. At the very least, exemplary damages-which Coase has ruled
out by assuftiption-would also be requested. Most lawyers could seek
compensatory damages for injury already suffered and equitable relief
to prevent the rancher from conducting his ranching activities "in
such manner" as to inflict harm upon the farmer.
78. Id., at 5.
79. The reader must be cautioned that Coase's usage of the expression "value elsewhere of
the resources used" as an equivalent to the words opportunity cost need not necessarily mean
the value of the resources in another location in the same activity. The phrase merely means
that the opportunity cost is measured by the value of the given quantity of resources if they
were not devoted to farming in this location. The "value elsewhere" of the resources used could
be their value in some other activity (production of Brand X) at this location or in another place
or by farming there. In short, "elsewhere" is not a term specifying a geographical location. In
the example under discussion, the "value elsewhere" of the resources devoted to producing
three steers is simply the sum of the total variable and fixed costs in Table 2 and the value of six
tons of crops destroyed is $6. The total "opportunity cost" to society is thus $23, the rancher's
total cost of producing three steers.
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A close reading of Coase's paper and of its predecessorsO suggests
that his failure to analyze his farmer-rancher example in a legal
situation ("social arrangement") involving enforcement of an equitable remedy has been the result of his failure to understand the
difference between the nature and purposes of equitable remedies and
the compensatory damage remedy. The same is true of many of his
disciples. At times Coase seems to have assumed that the plaintiff and
defendant in a case involving an injunction have a knowledge of the
values to them, respectively, of enforcement and of nonenforcement
equivalent to that possessed by parties with respect to damages in an
action for liquidated damages. In discussing one reported decision in
which the court granted a mandatory injunction to the plaintiff
requiring the defendant to control the harmjul effects upon the
plaintiff of the defendant's activities, Coase has asserted, "With
costless market transactions, the decision of the courts concerning
liability for damages would be without effect on the allocation of
resources '"81 Not only did the case under discussion by Coase involve
continuing prospective injury to the plaintiff, but also the court
granted the requested injuntion and the Master of the Rolls remarked:
. .. as has often been said in these cases, the Plaintiff is not bound
to go on bringing actions for damages every day when he is entitled to
82
an injunction."
The counterpart in economic analysis of the compensatory damage
remedy is a compensating tax (equal to the damage cost) imposed by a
legislature. From the time of A. C. Pigou's 83 classic work on the
problem of social cost to the present-with the exception of those who
have followed the teachings of Coase-economists have taken the
view that a legislatively-imposed tax (equal to the damage cost)
imposed upon the damager is the "proper" way to deal with the
problem. 84 It is not always been made clear, however, whether the
taxing-authority is to use the tax proceeds to reimburse those who
suffer injury. Compensating taxes and damage payments can easily be
dealt with in economic theory by making appropriate adjustments in
the cost and revenue curves of firms. Equitable remedies and
abatement regulations have not been the subject of extensive analysis
by economic theorists; apparently because many economists think
that such rules do not lend themselves readily to formal theorizing (in
terms of the traditional apparatus of price theory).
Coase and his followers have been careful to eliminate from their
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Coase, The FederalCommunications Commission, 2 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1959).
Coase, supra note 1, at 10.
Sturges v. Bridgeman, 11 Ch. D. 852, 855 (1879).
A. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (1920).
Baumol, supra note 17; Wellisz, supra note 75.
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statements of the problem any suggestion of specific intent on the part
of the damager to inflict injury upon anyone. He intends to produce
"goods." Coase's analysis of the case of short-run adjustment of the
rancher's output at the given price under a rule of liability explained
earlier is an analysis based on an assumption that the size of the ranch
is limited in form but not in substance to the rancher's land. The
ranch does not include the farm although the straying of the steers is
"inevitable" and also profitable.
Since all inputs are assumed variable in the long-run 85 in economics, Coase's long-run solution to the liability case is one in which
the quantity of land devoted to ranching is increased in form but not
in substance, while the quantity of land devoted to producing the
crop on the farm is decreased. Thus, in his analysis of the long-run
case of liability, Coase has stated as his coda this proposition:
• . . It follows [under the conditions assumed in our arithmetical
and graphical example explaining his short-run case] that it would
be desirable to abandon cultivation of the land and release the
factors employed for production elsewhere. . . .Whether the
cattle-raiser pays the farmer to leave the land uncultivated or
himself rents the land by paying the land-owner an amount
slightly greater than the farmer would pay (if the farmer was
himself renting the land), the final result would be the same and
maximize the value of production.86
In the long run therefore, in form though not in substance, the
quantity of land devoted to ranching is increased, and that devoted to
crop production is in fact decreased. In the short run, the rancher
pays damages for the use of the farmer's land, and crop destruction
occurs; in the long run, the rancher pays rent for the use of that land
and cultivation is abandoned, but the farmer produces $10 worth of
output elsewhere. It is assumed that price is a measure of social value,
and since the resources are being allocated in accordance with
consumer preferences, Coase has produced his widely-accepted
conclusion that-under his assumptions-"the value of production will
be maximized."
Coase has emphasized in this context that this "desirable" result
will occur if transactions cost are zero under perfect competition only
85. See note 22 supra. "Long run" is usually defined as a period of time within which all
inputs are variable. Coase's tacit definition apparently means "a period long enough for the
effects of the rancher's activities to force the farmer to abandon cultivation." The quantity of
land of the "ranch" and that devoted to the "inevitable" straying are the same in the short run
and in the long run in Coase's analysis, but the quantity of land devoted to crops is less in the
long run than in the short run.
86. Coase, supra note 1, at 6.
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if the parties are left free to make a private settlement of their
disagreement by saying:
A procedure which merely provided for payment for
damage to the crop caused by the cattle but which did not allow
for the possibility of cultivation being discontinued would result
in too small an employment of factors of production in cattle-raising and too large an employment of factors in cultivation of the
crop.87
This statement may be puzzling to lawyers, since the mere
existence of a rule of liability for compensatory damages does not bar
private settlement of a dispute. Courts have long welcomed private
settlement of disputes. Coase's statement may be aimed at proposals
for statutory compensatory tax schemes containing also provisions for
damage payments to the injured parties, but I am not aware of any
proposals to prohibit contracts for the rental of land.
Coase's explanation of this long-run solution can be illustrated in
terms of his numerical values although he has not provided such an
arithmetical illustration. According to Coase's assumption that the
damaging firm takes account of its damage liability in making its
output decisions, the value to the rancher of use of the farmer's land
for "inevitable" straying by the steers must be at least equal to the
amount of the damage inflicted at the equilibrium level of output, or
to $6 when three steers are produced. The rancher will thus be
willing to pay the farmer a rent of up to $6. The farmer's net rent
from farming the land has been assumed by Coase to be $2. Therefore
the farmer will accept any rent above $2 to abandon cultivation. A
range for bargaining exists; the assumption of profit-maximizing
behavior demands the conclusion that "a bargain will be made within
these limits."
Coase has not mentioned the point, nor to my knowledge, has its
significance been noticed elsewhere in the literature, but the abandonment of cultivation by the farmer eliminates the damage cost and
the payment of rent by the rancher increases his fixed cost.
Therefore, with cultivation abandoned and the farm rented by the
rancher, the solid MRC w/o Damage line in Figure 1 becomes the
relevant one and the rancher's equilibrium position will be point Ein.
Economists should avoid the temptation to say that "the marginal cost
curve has been shifted;" the MRC
Damage line in Figure 1 has not
been shifted. It has simply become irrelevant in the long-run
rental-abandonment situation and should be ignored except in discussions of comparisons of results. In the long-run rental-abandonment
87. Id.
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situation, the rancher will produce four steers and his total revenue
will be $36, while his total cost excluding the rent paid to the farmer
(in Table 2) will now be equal to TVC + F = $24 + $1 (since MDC and
TDC = 0). The rancher's "net gain" excluding the rent paid to the
farmer will thus amount to $36 - $25 = $11.
The difference between his "net gain" of $4 in the short-run
damage payment case and of $11 the long-run rental-abandonment
case can be explained simply. Elimination of the damage eliminates
his previous damage liability of $6, and the production of the fourth
steer causes no damage. The steer is sold at a price of $9 although its
marginal cost is only $8, yielding an addition of $1 to his "net gain."
Alternatively, elimination of the damage and damage liability (which
would have amounted to $10 when four steers are produced) plus the
$1 addition to his "net gain" from producing the fourth steer accounts
for his long-run rental-abandonment case "net gain" of $11. That the
price of the fourth steer is $9 while its marginal resource cost is $8 in
the long-run rental-abandonment equilibrium position is explained by
the fact that the rancher cannot produce a fractional steer (his output
function is discrete; his herd does not include pregnant cows).
Since the rancher's "net gain" will increase by $7 if he rents the
farm, he can pay the farmer a rent of up to $7. The total product will
consist of four steers, $10 of output from employment of the resources
elsewhere and cultivation of the farm abandoned. The value figure of
$10 of output elsewhere is the cost of the resources when they are
used by the farmer to produce crops on the farm. The figure thus
represents his total revenue from using the resources elsewhere after
he has abandoned crop production and includes any economic rent he
might receive by using the resources elsewhere.
That a legislative enactment providing for collection from the
damager by a tax agency of a compensating tax equal to the amount
of the damage inflicted and payment of the proceeds to the injured
parties will produce precisely the same result as does a judical rule of
liability for compensatory damages should be obvious. What difference can it possibly make whether a court orders the defendant to pay
damages measured at current market prices to the plaintiff or
whether some other agency collects a tax from the damager in the
same amount and disburses the proceeds to the injured party? But
some have apparently thought a difference between the two proce88
dures does exist.
Such tax schemes, which have stemmed from the work of Pigou, 89
88. Baumol, supra note 17; Wellisz, supra note 75; Buchanan, External Diseconomies,
Corrective Taxes, and Market Structure, 59 Am. Econ. Rev. 174 (1969).
89. Pigou, supranote 83; Buchanan, supra note 88.

NA TURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 13

rest on a different behavioral assumption from the one made by Coase
and this fact probably explains why some economists, using Pigou's
assumptions have undertaken to prove that Pigou was indeed correct
in concluding that such compensating taxes would "make private cost
and social cost equal." Pigou assumed that firms do not take account
of the marginal damage cost in making their output decisions. Coase
has assumed that firms do take account of such costs. Thus Coase has
implicitly assumed that the price paid by consumers includes the
damage cost while Pigou assumed that that price does not. In Figure 1
prior to imposition of a compensating tax, Pigou would have
considered the solid MRC w/o Damage line the relevant one; after
the tax he would have considered the dashed MRC + DAMAGE line
the relevant one. Thus, after imposition of a compensating tax equal
to the damage inflicted on the farmer when the rancher is producing
three steers, the Pigovian equilibrium position will be XD with three
steers, and six tons of crop produced and six tons of crop destroyed.
Pigovians and Coase agree on one point at least: the damage is
"inevitable" unless crop production is abandoned.
Coase's argument concerning the possibility of an agreement by
bargaining or of rental by the rancher of the farm applies to the tax
scheme in the long run also. The rancher could avoid the compensating tax by paying the farmer a rental in excess of $2 and the rancher
would be able to pay a rent of up to $7. Total product in the long run
would again consist of four steers, $10 of output elsewhere and
abandonment of cultivation by the farmer.
Coase has also analyzed the farmer rancher case in the legal
situation in which the legal rule is nonliability. It is not altogether
clear from his discussion whether he is analyzing a "social arrangement" in which a court has actually held that no liability exists or
one in which the question has not previously arisen and is therefore an
"undecided" question. His case of nonliability is aproxy for a
laissez-faire situation and his purpose seems to be to provide an
ethical justification for the retention by the rancher of the sum paid
by consumers for the damage inflicted on the farmer in the short run
and for the rancher's retention of the entire rent paid by consumers
for the use by the rancher of the farmer's land in the long run. I will
point out some of the flaws in his argument-these have apparently
escaped notice by others and have not previously appeared in the
literature.
In the nonliability case, Coase has concluded that under his
assumptions, the level of output will be the same as in the liability
case. His argument concerning the short-run nonliability situation is
as follows: if there is no liability, it is open to the farmer to bribe the
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rancher to reduce the size of his herd or to discontinue ranching
altogether, thereby either reducing or eliminating the damage. If the
rancher foregoes the bribe and produces three steers plus six tons of
crop damage, he incurs an opportunity cost of $6 which must be
added to his total variable cost at that level of output. The marginal
damage cost is now redefined as "marginal opportunity cost" so that
the MRC + Damage line in Figure 1, now redesignated at the MRC
+ Op. C. line, remains relevant. Under these circumstances, the
rancher's equilibrium position will be at ED as before. He will
produce three steers and receive a "net gain" of $4 as before. The
farmer, however, will not be reimbursed for the six tons of crop
destroyed and thus his total revenue will fall to $6, while his costs will
remain $10 so that his "net gain" will decline from $2 to -$4. The
rancher, on the other hand, will retain the $6 payment made by
consumers for the damage-as a reimbursement for the "bribe
foregone," that is, to cover his "opportunity cost." From Coase's point
of view his "net gain" will be the same as before, but his income will
now be $10. The increase in his income is accounted for by the fact
that he has produced three steers while destroying six tons of crop.
The farmer's loss is his gain. The total social product will be the same
in the short run under the two different social arrangements of
liability and nonliability-three steers, six tons of crop and six tons of
crop destroyed and one farmer considering the possibility of abandoning cultivation. The will of society will be done on the farm as it is on
the ranch.
The long-run nonliability or laissez-faire solution follows logically.
The $6 worth of uncompensated crop destruction suffered by the
farmer will result in his losing $4 and he will eventually be forced to
abandon cultivation. In the nonliability laissez-faire legal situation or
one in which no compensating tax is levied, there is no reason for the
profit-maximizing rancher to reduce his income by increasing his fixed
costs as a result of making a rental payment to the farmer. Just as he
can make costless use of the farmer's land for the "inevitable"
straying of his steers in the short run by destroying crops, so can the
rancher make costless use of the farmer's land for the same purpose in
the long run after crop production has been abandoned. Neither
Coase nor his disciples have emphasized this point. Abandonment of
cultivation by the farmer will reduce the rancher's opportunity cost
to zero. Since the farmer will offer no bribe, the rancher will have no
opportunity to forego one. With cultivation abandoned, no damage
will be done and the damage cost will be zero.
In the long-run laissez-faire (nonliability social arrangement),
abandonment legal situation, the solid MRC w/o Damage line in
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Figure 1 will again be relevant. With the minor exception of the fact
that the rancher will be able to pocket the sum paid-according to
Coase's assumptions-by consumers for the rental of the farmer's land
so that the rancher's "net gain" or functionless surplus is now equal to
$11 subject to no rental payment, the result in terms of total product
in the long run laissez-faire abandonment legal situation (the nonliability social arrangement) will be precisely the same as that in the
long-run rental abandonment legal situation (the liability or compensatory-tax social arrangement): four steers, $10 of output produced
elsewhere and abandonment of cultivation on the farm.
Using price as a measure of social value, some economists conclude
that since the rancher will be making a "more efficient" (in terms of
total product) use of the farmer's land than the farmer would have
made, an ethical qua functional justification exists for the retention by
the rancher of the full rent paid by consumers for the use of the
farmer's land for "inevitable" straying by the rancher's steers.
Having begun with an assumption that the land is more valuable
for ranching (the rent of the farm in steers when three are produced is
$6) than for farming (the rent in farming is $2), Coase has proved that
the land is, indeed, more valuable for ranching than for farming, and
the ethical judgment contained in the initial assumption inevitably
leads to a policy recommendation calling for a laissez-faire social
arrangement. The "public interest" is being served as defined by
economists "in their scientific journals. 90 (emphasis added).
Quaere: In Coase's long-run laissez-faire abandonment case, if the
"run" is long enough would the rancher also acquire title to the
farmer's land by adverse possession? Or would he merely acquire a
prescriptive right to its use by his "inevitably" straying steers?
Conceivably, titles to property and rights in land would then become
functions of long-run market prices, possessing the same degree of
certainty as do economic and weather forecasts. But resources used in
registering deeds could be saved. The legal theory would not be that
it is easier to fence cattle "out" than "in" or custom, but that
"relative prices determine rights in land."
I submit that the quaere is less frivolous than it may seem to be at
first glance: What are the implications for certainty of property rights
if the proposition advocated by Coase and others is adopted that
enforcement of such rights should be made a function of the relative
money values of the uses to which the property is put? That, after all,
is what the "economic theories of property" and of the state which
have sprung from Coase's farmer-rancher case are all about. 9 1 Nor is
90. Joint Econ. Comm., supra note 15.
91. See note 2supra.
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the problem confined to a long-run case. Assume a short-run situation
and a reversal of the relative values. Would a reversal of the court's
decision follow as a matter of course? Surely certainty of property
rights is not perceived as some ultimate, external end in itself; and if
not, what is the significance of such certainty as is sought for
maximization of total product?
In the laissez-faire abandonment (nonliability) case, Coase has
apparently justified the retention by the rancher of the sum paid by
consumers for the damage inflicted by adding this sum to the
rancher's cost and calling the sum added an "opportunity cost." In
Coase's words, "a receipt foregone of a given amount is the equivalent
of a payment of the same amount." 9 2 However, Coase has also said of
the bribe in his farmer-rancher case:
• . .But the farmer would not wish to pay to avoid crop damage
which the cattle-raiser would not be able to cause. For example,
the maximum annual payment the farmer could be induced to pay
could not exceed $9, the annual cost of fencing. And the farmer
would only be willing to pay this sum if it did not reduce his

earnings to a level that would cause him to abandon cultivation of
this particulartract of land.93 (emphasis added).
If the farmer would not be willing to pay a $9 bribe if doing so
"would cause him to abandon cultivation....., would he be willing
to pay a smaller sum which produced that same consequence? 9 4 The
difference between the farmer's total revenue and his total cost is his
economic rent (assumed by Coase to be $2). Reference to Table 1
discloses that Coase has assumed the total damage cost to be greater
than $2 at every level of output except that at which one steer is
produced. The farmer could not, therefore, offer a bribe which did
not result in his abandonment of production unless the rancher was
producing one steer only.
In the case of production of one steer only, the farmer would be
able to bribe the rancher without suffering a loss only if the rancher's
net gain, including the $1 paid by consumers for the $1 of crop
damage at this level of output was less than $2. If such a bribe was
offered and accepted, no steers would be produced and no opportunity cost would exist. If no bribe is offered so that no bribe can be
accepted or if a bribe is accepted, what is the cost of forebearance
from accepting that bribe? Coase's long-run laissez-faire (nonliability)
solution contemplates abandonment by the injured parties. Such an
end result is inconsistent with his argument that the farmer can bribe
92. Coase, supra note 1, at 7.
93. Id. at 4.
94. Id.
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the rancher and that therefore the rancher incurs an opportunity cost
as a result of his forebearance in not accepting the bribe. Coase's
opportunity cost of foregoing the bribe does not exist; it is an
economic fiction.
Coase's reliance on this economic fiction to justify retention by the
rancher of the sum paid by consumers for the damage has diverted
attention from the fact that other ranchers in the industry who do not
have the opportunity to inflict crop damage on neighboring farmers
do not enjoy an addition to their "net gain" comparable to the
additional income enjoyed by this rancher. Coase has explicitly 95
excluded this possibility from the discussion. Apparently this rancher
has access to a scarce resource to which other ranchers in the industry
do not have access. Coase's profit-maximizing railway company whose
engines are operated under conditions of perfect competition while
setting fire to the crops of farmers whose fields border the railway's
right of way similarly has access to a scarce resource. 96 So does the
factory whose emissions of smoke and smells dirty the housewives'
laundry and pollute the air. So does any firm whose plants are located
in a place such that by virtue of the plant's location it can dispose of
its waste at no cost into an environment to which it has no exclusive
title.
The additional income which the individual firm-assumed by
Coase to determine its output at a given price under perfect
competition-thus enjoys is clearly a form of economic rent. In
technical jargon, such a firm enjoys a site rent by virtue of its location.
This site rent is an addition to its "net gain" already defined as
economic rent also. In the short run in our nonliability example, the
rancher enjoys total economic rent of $10: he receives $6 of site rent
to add to his $4 of other economic rent (Coase's "net gain").
Moreover, if the damage occurs, according to Coase's assumptions this
"net gain" must be positive, although its magnitude cannot be
97
determined.
However, although he has made no mention of the fact, Coase's
analysis does provide a way of measuring that part of the firm's total
economic rent which is its site rent. He has shown that this site rent
(which he has called an "opportunity cost," thereby providing an
apparent ethical justification for its retention as income by the
rancher) is equal to the amount of damage inflicted at the specified
95.
96.
97.
Geoge

Id.
Id. at 32.
See Liebhafsky, supra note 76, at 482. Coase has solved-in-part-the problem Henry
could not solve.
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level of operations. If the damage is measurable, so is the site rent,
since Coase has shown that the two are equal.
Suppose, now, we consider an alternative social arrangement-one
not analyzed by Coase. Suppose a permanent mandatory injunction is
issued and enforced requiring the rancher to conduct his ranching
activities "in such manner" as not to inflict injury upon the farmer.
Compliance with the injunction by the rancher means that in
Figure 1 the MRC + Damage = MRC + Op. Cost line is again
irrelevant. No damage will be done and no bribe will be offered. The
rancher's "opportunity cost" will fall to zero along with the damage
cost. The solid MRC w/o Damage line is again the relevant one. The
numbers with asterisks in Table 2 are now the relevant ones, since the
$9 fence will have been built by the rancher.
Clearly, in Figure 1 at the given price of $9 per steer, compliance
with the injunction will produce precisely the same allocation of
resources to and output from ranching as is produced in Coase's two
long-run abandonment cases: four steers. But the $10 worth of
resources used by the farmer will continue to produce $12 worth of
crops on the farm as compared with $10 worth of output elsewhere in
Coase's two cases. De facto the ranching operation will now be
conducted on the ranch without making use of the infra marginal
farm land. No crops will be destroyed and no abandonment will
occur.
Coase's two cases have been widely accepted as "maximizing total
product" as he claims they do. The use of an equitable remedy
produces a larger total product than does either of Coase's "Maximizing" solutions. No damage is done to anyone in the case of the
equitable remedy. The damage appears not to be " inevitable" as
assumed in the Coase analysis and in the Pigovian compensatory tax
schemes. Both the farmer and the rancher "make" marginal cost
equal to marginal revenue. Even when all the assumptions of the
received price theory and the Coase argument are granted for the
sake of argument only, institutional arrangements and the rule of law
do seem to "matter" after all.
In our example, the rancher's fixed costs will increase by the cost of
the fence equal to $9. Compliance with the injunction also eliminates
the damage cost qua "opportunity cost." The cost of compliance is
independent of the level of output and has no effect on the marginal
resource cost (which is a function of output). The enforcement of an
equitable remedy in our example is equivalent to imposition of a
lump sum tax equal to the fixed cost of compliance. In a case of
pollution abatement involving both fixed and variable costs, an
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administrative agency can use a combined injunction-tax-tax credit
remedy and maximize output while reducing or eliminating pollu98
tion.
In our example the rancher's "net gain" will be positive even after
the fence has been built. His total revenue will be (4 x $9) = $36 and
his total cost will be $34; thus his economic rent will be $2. The
farmer's economic rent will also be $2. The sum of the two "net
gains" will be $4. The prices to consumers are the same as before. The
damage inflicted by the rancher's "inevitably" straying steers adds
nothing to the value of his steers. Elimination of that damage
subtracts nothing from their value. The straying is "inevitable" only if
consideration of alternatives to the market solution is precluded
because a laissez-faire solution is assumed in the inception.
The source of funds for payment for the fence can be explained
simply. The cost of the fence is $9. The amount paid by consumers for
the damage equal to $6 is a set-off against this $9. The rancher's
unearned increment will fall from $4 (in Coases's two short-run cases)
to $2, bringing the amount of the set-off to $8. The remaining $1 cost
of the fence is accounted for by the fact that the marginal cost of the
fourth steer is $8 and its price is $9. Thus the set-off is complete. 99
98. Such a injunction-tax-tax credit remedy is explained later in the text. The cost of Coase's
fence is a fixed cost at some levels of output and then may increase at some higher level of
output. He has said that a rancher who wished to raise a herd of "4 or more steers" would build
the fence but he has added that a more expensive fence might be needed if more or heavier
steers were likely to lean against it. But the rancher would not "wish" to increase the size of his
herd unless the price of steers changed. Coase has limited his analysis to a case of adjustment to
a position of equilibrium from a position of disequilibrium and has not considered how the
results would be affected by the remedy employed in such a case. I will discuss such a case also
later. It is not the function of judges nor the business of courts to supervise continuing optimal
allocations; if it were, we ought to call our judges "commissars." In a dynamic economy, policies
to abate pollution and at the same time insure a continuing optimal allocation of resources are
problems to be dealt with by legislatures and implemented by administrative agencies. In any
case of externalities in which a fixed cost only is involved, an equitable remedy (injunction) is
sufficient; recognition of that fact leads to the discovery of the errors in Coase's analysis and
assists in the invention of a combination remedy to deal with the problem. The cost of
compliance (building a wall, a higher chimney, or a fence) is independent of output if a fixed
cost only is incurred and compliance in such a case eliminates the damage cost without creating
any variable cost; output of the damaging firm must increase and that of the damaged firm will
not decrease under Coase's assumptions. Compliance with the injunction on Coase's facts and
according to his assumptions decreases the rancher's income as well as his output at the given
price. The gain to society is the rent from crop production not lost because no abandonment of
cultivation takes place. The rancher is confined to raising his steers on his own property.
99. An alternative explanation can also be given. In the long-run nonliability case the
rancher enjoys a net rent of $11 since he is able to make costless use of the farm for the
"inevitable straying." The cost of the fence is $9 and the rancher's net income thus falls from
$11 to $2. Instead of increasing his income by forcing the farmer to abandon cultivation and
making costless use of the farmer's land, the rancher reduces his personal consumption of goods.
Society gains the net rent in crops which would have been lost by the abandonment, since
abandonment now does not occur.
Davis and Whinston have taken the view that maximization of the joint rent is the test to be
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Just as the site rent accounts for the damage payment in the case of
liability, so does the site rent plus a portion of the other economic
rent ultimately bear the burden of the cost of compliance with the
injunction. Anyone else bidding for the use of the land for ranching
purposes would have to take the cost of compliance into account and
would offer to rent the land for not more than $2. A new injunction
would be granted requiring compliance on his part, given the same
facts.
Had the rancher built the fence voluntarily, the same total product
would have been produced as is when an equitable remedy is used.
However-in keeping with that which has been received-it would
have been irrational for him to build the fence absent the injunction.
Doing so would have resulted in reducing his unearned increment qua
"net gain" by $2. Thus in the absence of use of an equitable remedy,
the rancher's self-interest and that of firms polluting the environment
or wasting resources prevents him and them from taking any actions
(having costs to them) to reduce or eliminate the harmful effects or
any waste resulting from their activities.
Coase's numerical example states that $12 of total revenue is
produced by the farmer at a cost of $10 in cultivating the land. This
seemingly innocent numerical example is fraught with obscurity in
the context of his paper. Coase has stated that the farmer's $10 cost
"(which is what he [the farmer] would pay . . ." for the use of the
resources on this land is "the additional product of the factors
elsewhere"-meaning thereby "the money value of the output resulting from the use of the resources in some way other than in farming
this land." 100 The farmer's cost of $10 is, therefore, the total revenue
he would receive from employing the resources "elsewhere." But
what is the "opportunity cost" of employing the released resources
"elsewhere"?
employed. In our example, their view must be qualified to include a condition specifying that
such rent be computed excluding abatement costs. In our example, excluding abatement cost,
the joint net rent would be $11 + $2 = $13, and this is the greatest net rent that can be
produced under the assumed conditions. See Davis & Whinston, Externalities, Welfareand the
Theory of Games, 70 J. Pol. Econ. 241, 242 (1962).
In the case of our example, the rancher maximizes his preferences. Thus, if he builds the $9
fence in compliance with the injunction, his preferences are clearly revealed. Given the
injunction, he is not indifferent with regard to (1) a market basket consisting of $9 more of goods
and the consequences of noncompliance and (2) a market basket containing $9 less of goods and
the consequences of compliance. If he builds the fence, his preference for the latter basket is
clearly, concretely revealed-and most especially so if his fence posts are embedded in a mixture
of cement and sand. Such fence posts, being affixed to the land, of course, become part of his
realty.
In short, the cost of the fence is financed by his economic rent or functionless surplus. The use
of the equitable remedy makes it a matter of self-interest for the rancher to carry on his gainful
activity in such a manner that the consequences of his doing so will not injure the farmer.
100. See note 79 supra.
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If the value of the resources in the laissez-faire abandonment case is
$10 when employed elsewhere, but if they have a value of $12 when
these resources are employed in farming the land when an equitable
remedy is enforced, is their value elsewhere $10 and their opportunity
cost $12? Or is the opportunity cost of adoption of a laissez-faire
policy $2?
Even more puzzling is this problem: If the value of the farmland is
greater when devoted to ranching than to crops, why would a rational
profit-maximizing individual devote any resources to farming the land
or to any activity other than ranching in the long run if he could make
a greater economic rent by ranching the land? Apparently Coase's
farmer is an irrational individual who does not in fact maximize his
"net gains" (since he is farming and not ranching) at the beginning of
the hypothetical case stated by Coase and is then transformed in some
unspecified way into a profit-maximizing individual when such a
transformation is called for by the conclusions desired. Why does the
farmer not turn to ranching himself in the long run? In short, Coase's
argument assumes the existence of a misallocation of resources and, at
the same time, such conditions as are necessary for the existence of an
optimal allocation.
An objection might be raised to enforcement of an equitable
remedy on grounds that such enforcement would leave the rancher
with less income than he would have under the laissez-faire solution.
But two points must be made in reply: (1) The distribution of income
is different in Coase's liability and nonliability cases but he has
considered them both optimal since the total output is the same in
both cases. Enforcement of an injunction produces a greater total
product than do any of the Coase cases. (2) The second point to be
made is that in evaluating a change by making use of the Pareto
optimality test (on which such an objection would rest) it is necessary
to select an initial position or a starting point from which to measure
the change. Writers using this test in this context invariably choose as
their starting point the positions of the parties at a time when one of
them is engaging in an activity which inflicts harm on the other. Thus,
in the case of the farmer and the rancher, let the starting point be the
position in which the rancher is raising three steers, destroying six
tons of the farmer's crops and the farmer is producing 12 tons but
selling six only on the free market since the rancher's steers destroy
six.
At this starting point, the rancher is inflicting harm on the farmer in
his own self-interest by engaging in activities which produce the
harmful effects but over which the rancher has sole control. All the
farmer has is a power to interrupt the effect of the rancher's
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activities; the farmer does not have control over the rancher's
activities. Moreover, the harm is the result of the rancher's private
decision, not subject to any procedural due process safeguards. For a
court to adopt the test of Pareto optimality under these conditions
would amount to validating the rancher's private decision to injure
the farmer. But more importantly: a decision of the court to adopt the
Pareto optimality test would, in effect, be a decision of the case prior
to trial. Even though the rancher is injuring the farmer, the test
precludes making the rancher worse off, and any decision holding him
liable for damages for the enforcement of an equitable remedy which
would reduce his income would make him worse off and is precluded.
The farmer has no remedy, and apparently no cause of action. Or put
more simply: If at a time when D's activity has effects injuring P, a
rule holds that no decision can be made making anyone worse off at
that time, P has no remedy, and apparently no cause of action.
Adoption of Pareto optimality as a universal ratio decidendi for all
time in all cases would undoubtedly help to clear dockets but that
such a rule would satisfy what Cardozo called "the primordial
necessity for social order" is less clear. One may doubt that the author
of the opinion in Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R. Co.1° 1 would have
accepted such a universal ratio decidendi.
Coase's use of the word bribe is unfortunate; he has used his bribery
argument both (1) to state the tautology that if the land is devoted to
its most productive use total output will be maximized and (2) in a
quasi-ethical sense to justify the use of, and the retention by the
rancher of the entire rent from, the farmer's land in the nonliability
case as a reward for destroying crops and devoting the land to its
"most valuable use" in maximizing preferences. In the liability case,
the rancher does pay to the farmer part of the rent paid by consumers
for the use of the land-only because he can reduce his damage
payments by doing so. But if the retention by the rancher of the
amount paid by consumers for use of the farmer's land can be justified
in a case of nonliability, it would seem to follow that the income
enjoyed as a result of the use by a firm of the environment (including
pollution) can also be justified-after all, no one has title to the
environment; all are entitled to use it. But does it follow from this
that lack of a title entitles some to destroy it for gain so that it cannot
be used by others, not only of this generation, but also of future
generations?
At one point, Pigou did remark that "authoritative controls" might
be required "in addition to bounties."' 0 2 He did not, however, discuss
101. 248 N.Y. 399 (1928).
102. Pigou, supra note 83, at 194.
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the possibility that problems of social costs might require the use of a
combination of remedies such as an injunction and a compensating
tax or a tax credit to achieve " optimal allocation." Nor to my
knowledge has any other writer provided any economic analysis of the
use of such a remedy. Most have been distracted by Coase's paper
into a further discussion of compensatory taxes.
Such a combination remedy cannot be fashioned by the courts. But
that fact is nothing more than evidence that it is not the function of
the judiciary nor the business of courts to settle disputes by reference
to the question of whether or not an economist's conception of an
"optimal allocation of resources" will result from the decision. It has
been well said of private actions that "A lawsuit is an orderly way of
settling a dispute."10 3 Parties who are able to find a solution by
bargaining do not engage in lawsuits. Supervision of continuing
optimal allocation is not a judicial function.
A remedy consisting of an injunction and a compensating tax and a
tax credit is one which must be created by a legislature and
implemented by actions of an administrative agency, particularly if
the remedy is to prove effective in the face of changing economic
conditions. Such a remedy can be fashioned to deal with problems of
environmental pollution and an agency now exists, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), to implement it. To illustrate the use and
economic effects of such a mixed remedy, I will make use of the
numbers contained in Table 2 and of Figure 1. For generality,
redesignate the commodity sold as "Commodity X"; the reader can
simply substitute the words "Commodity X" for the word steers in
Table 2 and Figure 1.
In the general case of environmental control, there will be fixed
costs of installation of an abatement device and variable costs of
operation of the device. Our earlier result in the example of the use of
a mandatory injunction in Coase's farmer-rancher case has shown thai
(1) if compliance involves a fixed cost only, the case is equivalent to
one of imposition of a lump sum tax equal to the cost of compliance,
and the allocation of resources by the damaging firm to its activity
will be the same as it is under laissez-faire, but (2) since the net rent of
the damaged firm is not lost in the injunction case, total product will
be greater than in the laissez-faire case.
If abatement involves variable costs, the key to the problem is one
of employing a device to be used together with the injunction such
103. I do not recall the source of this comment which I have remembered since I first heard
it as an entering law student in 1946; I have a hunch Holmes said it. Perhaps some reader can
supply a reference. But in the light of the new economic theories of property, the sentence has
acquired an added meaning.
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that the marginal cost of abatement will be cancelled, leaving the
marginal total cost unaffected. Then the marginal total cost of the
firm will simply be its marginal resource cost.
A simple way to accomplish this result is to allow the firm a tax
credit equal to its expenditures to meet the variable cost of operation
of the abatement device. For example, assume that in Figure 1 and
Table 2, an abatement order has been issued and that the firm is in
equilibrium maximizing its "net gain" producing four units at point
E Inj. and spending $9 annually on the installation and maintenance
of an abatement device. Now assume that the price of its product
increases to $12 and that, in order to increase its output to six units of
X at which the marginal resource cost is also $12, the firm would have
to increase its expenditures on the abatement device by $9 to $18.
(Assume that production of four or less units of output requires an
expenditure of $9 for compliance but that production of five to eight
units doubles the expenditure for compliance so that production of six
units of output entails an $18 expenditure for compliance, thereby
assuming an "abatement cost function" of the type Coase has
assumed. The assumption is extreme since a fifty percent increase in
output results in doubling the abatement cost).
Under these circumstances, if the firm continued to produce four
units of output only, it would not have to increase its expenditure on
the device, while its total revenue would increase. Thus, when it is
producing four units at the new higher price, the firm's total cost
remains at $34 (we must use the cost figures bearing asterisks in Table
2) while its total revenue increases to (4)($12) = $48, and its
economic rent or functionless surplus increases from $2 to $14. The
$12 increase in its economic rent is depicted by area dRNEInj. in
Figure 1. However, if it increased its output to six units and increased
its expenditure on the device to $18, its total cost would rise to $56 +
$9 = $65 while its total revenue would amount to (6 x $12) = $72. Its
income would thus amount to $7 only and it would continue (under
Coase's assumptions) to produce four units. But if the firm were given
a tax credit equal to the increase in the cost of the abatement device,
its total cost would be equal to $56 and it would receive a net gain
equal to $16 while producing 6 units of output and taking measures to
control the harmful environmental effects of its activities. Under an
injunction-tax credit scheme, taxpayers bear the burden of the
variable cost of abatement, even though under the assumptions made
in Coase's farmer-rancher example the price paid by consumers
includes the cost of the damage. A crucial assumption of his
demonstration of the equivalence of the results in the liability and

NA TURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 13

nonliability situations is that the damage can be measured at the
market price. His analysis is irrelevant in pollution cases if that
assumption is not satisfied. If taxpayers bear the burden of the
variable cost of abatement, the firm will be able to continue to enjoy
such site rent (included in its profit) as may exceed the fixed cost of
abatement. The advocates of laissez-faire take the view that taxpayers
"should" bear this burden thus paying a price for their use of the
environment. This view states a value judgment.
The quality of the use made of the environment by those who do
not pollute is not the same as the quality of the use by those who do
pollute it. 1 ° 4 Those who merely enjoy the benefits of the environment
without polluting it do not diminish its quantity; those who pollute it,
denying its use to others, do diminish its quantity. After a firm has
installed an abatement device and started to operate it, does the firm
discontinue its use of the environment? or does the firm's use of the
environment then become more nearly qualitatively comparable to
the use made of it by those whose use does not diminish its quantity
nor deny its use to others? Who profits from the effects of the activity
whose effects are being abated? Who would have the potential power
to minimize abatement costs? And under what conditions would an
incentive to exercise that power exist?
The variable cost of operating the abatement device can be
imposed upon the polluting firm without affecting the allocation of
resources by imposing a lump sum tax (a fixed cost whose amount is
independent of output) upon the firm along with the injunction and
granting a tax credit. The measure of the tax does not affect the
economic analysis of its effects, and the reader may choose his own
measure. For clarity of exposition, I will assume that the lump sum
tax is defined as equal to the variable cost of operation of the
abatement device at some specified level of operation of the
activity.10.5 The specified level would be used for tax purposes only
104. As Baumol has also pointed out, and Pigou obviously knew. Baumol, supra note 17;
Pigou, supra note 83.
105. The specified level of operations could be the existing level at the time the proceeding
was begun (on the theory that firms always maximize profits), or it could be some percentage of
the average level of past operations.
An alternative to fixing the lump sum tax in this way would be to levy a tax on changes in the
firm's economic rent resulting from the price change. Even though the economic rent cannot be
determined, changes in the economic rent can be estimated.
Moreover, changes in variable expenditures on the device will not occur unless output
changes. And output changes are a function of price changes. Thus, in Figure 1 and Table 2 if
the price of the commodity rose from $9 to $12, if the firm continued to produce four units at
the $12 price, its economic rent would increase by (4x$3) = $12, or by $3 for every unit of
output sold. If the firm increased its output beyond four units, its economic rent would increase
by more than $12. This magnitude is represented by area dRNEInj. in Figure 1. This increase in
the economic rent is clearly a windfall gain. Suppose the agency was empowered to impose a tax
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and the firm would be free to operate at any level it wished to. The
imposition of the lump sum tax would increase the firm's fixed costs.
Marginal costs would not be affected. However, the firm would also
be receiving a tax credit equal to its variable expenditures for
operating the device. The variable costs of operating the device
would increase the firm's total costs, but the tax credit would reduce
the firm's total costs simultaneously by the same amount, so that the
total cost would be unaffected. Thus, if the firm happened to find that
its profit-maximizing output coincided with the specified level of
operations used for the tax base and actually operated at that point,
its expenditures on the variable cost of operating the device would
reduce its tax liability at that point to zero. In effect, the firm would
be paying its tax in kind-by paying for the variable cost of pollution
abatement it would be controlling the effects of its polluting
activities. Taxpayers who did not also consume the goods would pay
no abatement costs. With abatement in effect, the firm and others
would be making the same qualitative use of the environment and no
one would be denying its use to others or destroying it. And by Coase's
test, resources would be optimally allocated. But do empirical studies
show significant losses from misallocation in terms of GNP? Or is
optimal allocation just "a game economists play"?
Having outlined the problem and its elements, I leave further study
of such cases to the mathematical economists, merely noting that a
continuing rule-making proceeding could be used by the regulatory
agency to make self-correcting value judgments in fixing the specified
output level and details of such a combined injunction-tax-tax credit
remedy. The remedy would be equally effective under Coase's and
Pigou's assumptions about costs.
From the point of view of the law, no discrimination would be
involved; the standards would apply equally to all firms within the
same class; full procedural due process would be accorded in the
rule-making procedure; and, of course, appeal from the regulatory
10 6
agency's ruling to the courts would exist.
The injunction-tax-tax credit scheme which I have outlined above
satisfies the Coase test of optimal allocation and continues to assume
for the purpose of argument only without granting that price is a
of 66% percent on this increase in the economic rent. If the firm produced four units, its tax
credit would be zero but its tax liability would be $8 and its income after taxes would then be
$14-$8 = $6. But if the firm did increase output to six units, its tax credit would be $9 and
would cancel its tax liability of $8. The firm's net income after taxes would be $7. The firm
would produce six units and the price of $12 is equal to the marginal resource cost of $12 at that
output level in Table 2.
106. A procedure for administrative action already exists under the National Environmental
Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§4321-47 (1870).
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measure of social value, etc., and that optimal allocation is a test even
though that test is external to the problem.
I now reject these assumptions.
In its Annual Report for 1972, the Council on Environmental
Quality reported the results of several econometric studies concerning
the effect of pollution abatement regulations by saying:
The microeconomic studies indicated that none of the industries
studied would be severely impacted in that the long-run viability
of no industry is seriously threatened soley by the pollution
abatement costs estimated. However, profits will decline for some
firms in most of these industries because firms will not be able to
pass on the full cost of pollution abatement to consumers in the
form of higher prices ...
Most of the firms or plants that will be forced to close are
currently marginal operations (e.g., smaller, older, less efficient
producers) that were already in economic jeopardy due to other
competitive factors. In such cases, the impact of environmental
standards is only to accelerate closings that would have occurred
anyway. The pollution abatement costs either eliminate already
slender profit margins or reduce them to a level at which they fail
to justify the required capital expenditures on pollution abatement equipment (in terms of an adequate return on investment).
There are approximately 12,000 plants currently operating in
the industrial activities studied. Of these it is expected that
approximately 800 would close in the normal course of business
between 1972 and 1976. It would appear from the contractor's
evaluations that an additional 200-300 would be forced to close
because of pollution abatement requirements. Many of these
additional closings would appear to involve plants that were
vulnerable for other reasons and, hence, that were likely to have
closed anyway a few years later.107 (emphasis added)
The cost figures used in making these studies were accounting costs
and did not include Coase's "opportunity cost" of foregoing a bribe
qua damage cost. If such a cost were added to the costs of the
marginal producers ("smaller, older, less efficient firms"), the total
costs of such firms would exceed their total revenues. According to
Coase's assumptions such firms "should" be forced to close. Interpreted according to Coase's behavioral assumption, the studies would
thus seem to disclose that the abatement regulations resulted in an
increase in "economic efficiency."
In its Report, 108 the Council discussed problems of readjustment
107. Council on Environmental Quality, Third Annual Report of the Council on Environmental Quality 287 (1972).
108. Council on Environmental Quality 143 (1971).
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assistance (apparently resources are not employed "elsewhere" instanter). It called attention to the many indirect effects which may
result from compliance with abatement regulation, including the
effect on firms forced out of the industry. It did so without assuming
perfect competition. Under such an assumption no readjustment
problems can exist.
Near the end of his paper, Coase has written:
If factors of production are thought of as rights, it becomes
easier to understand that the right to do something which has a
harmful effect (such as the creation of smoke, noise, smells, etc.) is
also a factor of production. 10 9
As it stands, the sentence seems to be an interesting example of
what courts have in mind when they have used the phrase "assuming
that which is to be decided." The statement, of course, assumes that a
"right to inflict injury" exists. In his farmer-rancher example Coase
has utilized the opportunity cost doctrine with its emphasis upon
mutually exclusive alternatives ("meat or crops") in an attempt to
provide an ethical basis for the existence of such a right. In his
philosophico-legal argument in support of the existence of this
"right," he has combined the opportunity cost doctrine with a
simplistic concept of comparing (money) values which a legal mind
may mistake for a rather naive version of the judicial concept
developed in Chancery of "balancing the equities" or "balancing the
interests."
Coase has opened his paper with two sentences stating the
problem, the "facts in his hypothetical cases," and then somewhat
later stated his argument. The following quotation contains the
"statement of facts" and the statement of the argument (the "theory
of his case for laissezfaire"):
This paper is concerned with those actions of business firms
which have harmful effects on others. A standard example is that
of a factory the smoke from which has harmful effects on those
occupying neighboring properties. ...
. . . The question is commonly thought of as one in which A
inflicts harm on B and what has to be decided is: how should we
retrain A? But this is wrong. We are dealing with a problem of a
reciprocal nature. To avoid the harm to B would be to inflict harm
on A. The real question that has to be decided is: should A be
allowed to harm B or should B be allowed to harm A? The real
problem is to avoid the more serious harm. . . . What answer
should be given is, of course, not clear unless we know the value of
109. Coase, supra note 1, at 44.
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what is obtained as well as the value of what is sacrificed to obtain
it . . ..110

The facts are special: the injury is to those occupying neighboring
property; without more, it cannot be said that the facts assumed
include the problem of injury to the environment; and in Coase's
analysis such injuries are not considered. Upon a casual first reading of
the statement of the argument, one is inclined to agree. But upon
reading his paper and then critically reading again the statement of
the argument, questions arise. The statement of the argument sounds
like a case of "balancing the equities" and the question of "restraint"
in a case of continuing injury suggests an equitable remedy; but the
"value" contemplated in the concluding sentence is a precise money
value measured at market prices and is taken to be equivalent to
social value. Apparently the damage remedy is adequate. Moreover,
an ethical proposition has been included in the statement of facts by
the statement put in the form of a question which reads: "The real
question that has to be decided is: should A be allowed to harm B or
should B be allowed to harm A?" No assumption that B is in fact
harming A has previously been made. A decision by a court in favor of
B would have an effect on A but would that decision constitute an act
by B harming A? By putting the matter in this way, not only have the
choices been made mutually exclusive, but also an ethical justification
seems to exist for a decision against B in precisely the same way in
which the use of the opportunity cost doctrine results in an ethical
justification for the retention by A of the amount paid for the damage

by the consumers.
The statement which precedes the one under discussion reads: "To
avoid the harm to B would be to inflict harm on A". If this statement
constitutes nothing more than a belated recognition of the fact that an
adversary proceeding involves parties having conflicting interests, no
exception need be taken. This statement surely is not intended to
demonstrate that if B succeeds in a legal or equitable action against A
based on the injury being done by A, B has undertaken an unethical
act or inflicted legal harm on A? According to the "statement of
facts," B is the passive recipient of the effects of a gainful activity
under A's control.
In 1901 in Sullivan v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co.,1' the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania reversed the decision of a trial court and
directed it to issue an injunction against the defendant steel company
"perpetually enjoining Jones & Laughlin Steel Company . . .from
110. Id.
at 1, 2.
111.

208 Pa. 540, 57 A. 1065 (1901).
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such operation of its furnaces . . . as to cause to be emitted
therefrom clouds of ore dust working and causing the injury to the
property of the appellants . . . found by the court below." The court
below had rested its denial of the request for the decree on its finding
that the harm (with emphasis on money values) to the defendant from
issuing the decree would be greater than the harm being suffered by
the plaintiff. Coase's question was thus squarely raised. But Brown, J.
said in the majority opinion:
' . * And as to the principle involved, that a chancellor will
refuse to enjoin when greater injury will result from granting than
from refusing an injunction, it is enough to observe that it has no
application where the act complained of is in itself as well as in its
incidents tortious. In such a case it cannot be said that injury
would result from an injunction,for no man can complain that he
is injured by being prevented from doing to the hurt of another
that which he has no right to do. Nor can it make the slightest
difference that plaintiff's property is of insignificant value to him
as compared with the advantages that would accrue to the
defendants from its occupation. 112 (emphasis added).
Three justices dissented. They and the trial court agreed that the
granting of the decree would result in the demise of the defendant
company and the steel industry in Allegheny County "within a year."
And in another case, in which sulphur dioxide fumes and dust
discharged from the stack of the defendant's smelter resulted in injury
to the plaintiff's farm, the issue presented by Coase's proposition:
"Should A be allowed to harm B or should B be allowed to harm A?"
was anticipated and evaluated by Marshall, J. in these words:
Stated in another way, the claim in effect is that one wrongfully
invading the legal rights of his neighbor will be permitted by a
court of equity to continue the wrong indefinitely on condition
that he invests sufficient capital in the undertaking.
I am unable to accede to this statement of the law. If correct,
the property of the poor is held by uncertain tenure, and the
constitutional provision forbidding the taking of property for
private use would be of no avail. As a substitute it would be
declared that private property is held on the condition that it may
be taken by any person who can make a more profitable use of
it. . . .In a state of society the right of the individual must to
some extent be sacrificed to the rights of the social body; but this
does not warrant the forcible taking of property from a man of
small means to give it to the wealthy man on grounds that the
public will be indirectly advantaged by the greater activity of the
112. Id. at 1071.
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capitalist. Public policy, I think, is more concerned in the
protection of individual rights than in 11the profits to inure to
individuals by the invasion of those rights. 3

Justice Marshall's pointed comment applied to Coase's economic
theory of liability produces the conclusion that the power of eminent
domain should be conferred temporarily upon those individuals whose
activities have the greatest market value; provided, however that that
power shall pass immediately and peacefully to others when relative
prices change.
Although Coase has discussed his four English cases as if they were
concerned with a simple issue, the legal problems raised in these cases
range from questions of tort and rights in land to questions of
jurisdiction of courts of equity.
Coase's philosophico-legal argument does not appear clearly until he
has begun his discussion of his third case, Bryant v. Lefever. 114 In this
case, the plaintiff and the defendant lived in neighboring residences.
The jury found:
• . . Before 1876 the plaintiff was able to light a fire in any room

of his house without the chinmeys smoking; the two houses had
remained in the same condition for some thirty or forty years. In
1876 the defendants took down their house and began to rebuild
it. They carried up a wall by the side of the plaintiff's chimneys
much beyond its original height, and stacked timber on the roof of
their own house, and thereby caused plaintiff's chimneys to smoke
[because the new higher wall with timber stacked
on it interfered
115
with the flow of air whenever he lighted fires.]

The plaintiff was awarded damages and the defendant appealed. The
lower court's decision was reversed on the appeal.
Coase has employed this case as an ethical rationalization of his
argument that both parties should bear the cost of an injury inflicted
by A on B. He has done so be arguing that in this case both parties
"caused" the nuisance in fact. Thus he has argued:
. . . Who caused the smoke nuisance? The answer seems faily
clear. The smoke nuisance was caused both by the man who built
the wall and by the man who lit the fires. Given the fires, there
would have been no smoke nuisance without the wall; given the

wall, there would have been no smoke nuisance without the
fires ....
...
. The [appeal] judges' contention that it was the man who
lit the fires who alone caused the smoke nuisance is true only if we
113. McCleery v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 140 F. 951, 952.
114. 4 C.P.D. 172 (1878-79).
115. Id. at 173.
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assume that the wall is the given factor. That is what the judges
did by deciding that the man who erected the higher wall had a

legal right to do so. ... 116
But, although Coase has not discussed the matter, the questions
which the judges met at the threshold were those of whether or not
the plaintiff had acquired a right to an unimpeded flow of air "over
the general unlimited surface" of his neighbors, and what would be
the social consequences of holding that he had acquired such a right.
Absent such a right, he had no cause of action. After considering the
question of whether the plaintiff could acquire greater "natural"
(legal) rights in his land by building a house upon it than he possessed
before the house was built and answering the question in the negative,
Bramwell, L.J. (joined by Brett) pointed out that no such right could
have been acquired by prescription either since or prior to the
defendant's acts of building the wall and stacking timber upon it,
because the only means open to the defendant of defeating acquisition
of such a prescriptive right would have been that of "surrounding the
land with erections as high as it might at any time be wanted to build
on the land.' 117 To hold that a prescriptive right could be acquired by
the plaintiff under these conditions would obviously restrict future
uses of the defendant's land-possibly resulting eventually in a
misallocation of resources. Indeed, it was also pointed out that to hold
that such a prescriptive right existed-and to hold that the defendant
thus could not use his land as he did-would also have the result of
preventing him from building an additional story of the same height
on his house.
Cotton, L. J. provided an additional opinion stating that "a right by
way of easement to the access of air over the general unlimited
surface of a neighbor cannot be acquired by mere enjoyment." The
plaintiff had not "acquired a right to get rid of this [smoke] in a
particular way which has been interfered with by his neighbors."" 18
Consider the implications for land use and development of a holding
that one can acquire a prescriptive right to such a particular use of
the environment. The decision reduced the defendant's site rent. The
court pointed out that the activity (building the fires) of whose effects
the plaintiff complained was under his control and that he could have
eliminated the effects by building higher chimneys. That is what is
meant by the statement that "the plaintiff creates the smoke which
interferes with his comfort." Therefore, the defendant did not cause
an actionable nuisance.
116. Coase, supra note 1, at 13.
117. Bryant v. Forbes, 4 C. P. D. 172, 178 (1878-79).
118. Id. at 181.
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In this case it was the plaintiff who engaged in and had control over
the activity whose effects were complained of; in two of the other
three cited by Coase1 19 it was the defendant who had control over the
activity whose effects resulted in injury. In the other decision the
defendant used self-help and the plaintiff had no alternative; his
resources were not mobile, and other special facts existed. The first
three decisions mentioned above rest on the same functional principle: one who engages in an activity whose effects result in an injury is
responsible for those effects-it is he who is peculiarly in a position to
control the activity and to abate its effects. The other party does not
have that power of control over the activity; at best he may be able to
intercept the effects of the activity upon a lawful activity he himself
is carrying on. The use of an equitable remedy in the farmer-rancher
case rests on the same principle. The functional concept of individual
responsibility was recognized in law long before existentialism was
invented. Such a concept is consistent with the concept of law as an
instrument of social order.
Coase has followed his discussion of Bryant v. Lefever by asserting
that in the farmer-rancher case "there would be no crop damage
without the crops." 120 True, but the farmer's planting of crops did not
cause the cattle to stray "inevitably;" he could have built a fence to
intercept the effects of the rancher's cattle raising activities, but the
rancher was in control of his ranching activities. He could have
controlled the straying. No question existed of the farmer's legal right
to grow crops. His growing them was an activity which had no
physical effect on the rancher's property. Where then is the ethical
justification for holding the farmer liable for the injury he suffered?
The crops did not destroy any steers, nor did they destroy themselves.
Apparently a key case in Coase's thinking has been Sturges v.
Bridgeman.121 In this case, a doctor was granted an injunction against
a neighboring confectioner whose machinery was embedded in a
party wall separating the doctor's consulting room from the confectioner's kitchen. The doctor had built the consulting room many years
after the machinery was embedded. The plaintiff alleged "that the
noise and vibration" when the machinery was in use "were very
great" and were heard in his consulting room; that "such noise and
vibration seriously annoyed and disturbed the plaintiff and materially
interfered with him in the practice of his profession," preventing him
from "examining his patients for diseases of the chest" apparently
with a stethoscope; and that he "also found it impossible to engage
119. Coase, supra note 1, at 8, 10.
120. Id. at 13.
121. 11 Ch. D. 852(1879).
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with effect in any occupation requiring deep thought and attention."1 22 Coase has said of the injunction granted to the doctor:
• . . The doctor therefore brought a legal action to force the
confectioner to stop using his machinery. The courts had little
difficulty in granting the doctor the injuncion he sought ...
The court's decision established that the doctor had the right to
prevent the confectioner from using his machinery .... 12:3
One with legal training must surely wonder about whether or not
an injunction framed in the terms Coase has specified would not be
broader than the plaintiff's need and open to objection by the
defendant on this ground; and if it was, how the case was decided.
According to the report of the decision, the plaintiff "claimed an
injunction to restrain the Defendant from using his mortars and
12 4
pestles in such manner as to cause him [plaintiff] annoyance."'
(emphasis added). One need not be a student of the law to recognize
the difference between Coase's "to restrain from using" and the
actuality, "to restrain . .. from using in such manner . . . (emphasis added). The economic analysis of the two situations, as we have
seen, is different. Coase's interpretation would prohibit the activity
whose effects produced the harm; but the plaintiff prayed for a
remedy requiring the defendant to conduct his gainful activity in such
a way as to eliminate its harmful effect, not that the activity itself
itself be discontinued. Coase's reading of the terms of the injunction
in Sturges has, of course, been consistent with his "opportunity cost"
economic analysis, an analysis which fails to consider abatement of
the effects of the activity causing the harm without elimination of the
activity itself. Coase's reading of the terms of the injunction is thus
also consistent with his advocacy of a laissez-faire solution-indeed,
such a reading is a condition precedent to the advocacy of that
solution.
During his discussion of this decision, Coase has remarked,
... . The basic conditions are exactly the same in this case as
they were in the example of the cattle which destroyed crops.
With costless market transactions, the decision of the courts
concerning liability for12damages
would be without effect on the
5
allocation of resources.
But in his farmer-rancher example, Coase has limited his discussion of
the case of "liability for damage" to a case of compensatory damages
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 853.
Coase, supra note 1, at 9.
Sturges v. Bridgeman, 11 Ch. D. 852, 853 (1879).
Coase, supra note 1, at 10.
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measured at the market price and we have seen that if an equitable
remedy is enforced in the case he has put, under his assumptions the
126
economic analysis is not the same and the total output is greater.
Coase has devoted most of his discussion of the cases presently
under consideration to a direct application of the results obtained in
his farmer-rancher bargaining situation to the facts in these decided
cases. Even before Coase's paper was published, philosophers of
science 127 had pointed to the illegitimacy of this procedure which
involves essentially "substituting one's model with its assumtions for
the real world case." Thus, in a curious passage (whose premise and
relevance are not clear) Coase has argued that it "would have been
possible" for the parties to modify the decision of the court in Sturges,
saying:
. . . it would have been possible to modify the arrangements
envisaged in the legal ruling by means of a bargain between the
parties.
The doctor would have been willing to waive his right and
allow the machinery to continue in operation if the confectioner
would have paid him a sum of money which was greater than the
loss of income which he would suffer from having to move to a
more costly or less convenient location or from having to curtail
his activities at this location or . . . from having to build a
separate wall . . 128
But if the doctor had lost the case, the argument goes on, the doctor
would have had to bribe the confectioner.
Thus, one learns that in the case of a permanent mandatory
injunction, the plaintiff knows the money value of enforcement to him
both now and in the future, just as the defendant similarly knows the
money value of nonenforcement; and a bargain is possible in a case in
which an injunction has been granted if the money value to the
defendant of nonenforcement exeeds the money value to the plaintiff
of enforcement; provided however that the plaintiff and defendant in
the actual dispute are rational profit-maximizing entrepreneurs-as in
Coase's farmer-rancher case, are motivated solely by considerations of
126. Other writers have followed Coase in his view that the alternative to the injury is
discontinuation of the activity producing the injury. See Buchanan, supra note 88. This view is
apparently "inevitable" when the opportunity cost doctrine is employed.
127. Thus R. B. Braithwaite has remarked:
. . . There are, however, serious dangers in the use of models. . . . The first
danger is that the theory will be identified with the model for it, so that the
objects with which the model is concerned . . . will be supposed actually to be
the same as the theoretical constructs of the theory. . . . Thinking of scientific
theories by means of models is always as if thinking. (emphasis in the original.) R.
Braithwaite, Scientific Explanation 93 (1959).
128. Coase, supra note 1, at 9.
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monetary gain, and possess certain knowledge of the future and of the
relevant money values involved. One may wonder why the case was
not settled without a trial or whether the damage remedy may have
been adequate after all.
In short, Coase has assumed the existence of a "one to one"
correspondence between the assumptions in his farmer-rancher case
and the facts in Sturges and then criticized the decision made by the
court. What the judges should have done was "to compare the
[money] value of the cakes or iron lost" with "the additional [money]
value of the residential facilities obtained" and the larger and heavier
sum would have unbalanced the scale in the direction of the
"correct" decision. "But of this the judges seem to have been
129
unaware."
Coase has also argued that no nuisance existed until the doctor built
his consulting room and that therefore both parties "caused" the
nuisance.1 30 Coase has confused the lack of substantial interest on the
part of the doctor to support a cause of action with a cause in fact.
The confectioner in Sturges claimed that he had acquired a prescriptive right to the use of the party wall in the way in which he was
using it. The court answered this contention by saying that no
actionable nuisance existed prior to the time the doctor built his
consulting room because until that time he had no way of physically
or legally (lack of substantial interest) interfering with "that which
was done by the defendant."' 13 1 Therefore the defendant had not
acquired a prescriptive right to use the wall in such a way as to
interfere with any legitimate use the plaintiff wished to make of it.
There was "some" evidence.
' * ' of the garden wall having been subjected to vibration, but
this vibration, even if it existed at all, was so slight and the
complaint [of the previous occupant to the confectioner], if it
could be called a complaint, of the invalid lady, and can be looked
upon as evidence, was so trifling a character, that, upon the
maxim de minimis non curat lex, we arrive at the conclusion that
the Defendant's acts would not have given rise to any proceedings
at law or in equity. 13 2
129. Id. at 10.
130. Id. at 13.
131. 11 Ch. D. 852(1879).
132. Id. at 863. Coase in his note 13 has quoted a portion of this statement also but has
omitted the words "ifit could be called a complaint, of the invalid lady and can be looked upon
as evidence . . ."Coase, supra note 1, at 14. Jessel, M. R.had earlier remarked:
The only serious point that has been argued for the Defendant is that by virtue
of the statute or by prescription, he was entitled as against the Plaintiff to make
this noise and commit a nuisance. . . . As far as I can see there was until a recent
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Indeed, it hardly seems necessary to point out that the defendant's
claim that he has acquired a prescriptive right to use the wall in such
a way as to produce noise and vibrations was in itself a recognition by
him that it was his activity which produced the effect. When the
doctor made use of his established legal right to use the wall, the
doctor did not "cause" the nuisance in fact; but he did acquire a
substantial interest, one sufficient to support his action for an
injunction. No ethical ground for holding the doctor liable exists; his
"doctoring" activity did not produce effects injuring the defendant
confectioner. The confectioner's activities combined with his attempt
to appropriate for his own use the party wall produced an effect
which denied to the doctor the use of the wall, to which the doctor
had an equal right. The confectioner had sole control over his
activity. Suppose the court had held the other way. How would the
use of party walls in general and total product have been affected?
Coase has also discussed Cooke v. Forbes133 in which fumes
produced by the activities of a manufacturer of ammonium sulfate
injured the products of a producer of cocoanut fibre matting. In this
case, the effect of the activity complained of was accidental, remedial
action was taken, and action to control the effects of the activity
which caused the injury was also being taken by the ammonium
sulfate producer. The case did not involve continuing injury and the
one in control of the activity was responsibly taking measures to
control its effects. The court held that no injunction would lie-as
should have been obvious to the plaintiff's lawyers-and the plaintiff
was left to seek his damage remedy. This case was clearly one
concerned with the problem of the adequacy of the damage remedy.
Since the effects were the result of accidents in the conduct of the
defendant's activities, how could they have been caused by both
parties? Surely this case does not seriously purport to strengthen
Coase's argument that both parties "cause" the harm?
The fourth case discussed by Coase, Bass v. Gregory,13 4 involved an
action for an injunction and damages-by one claiming a prescriptively-acquired right to use a ventilating shaft running from his cellar into
an unused well in an adjoining yard to use a ventilating shaft running
from his cellar into an unused well in an adjoining yard owned by the
defendant-to require the defendant to discontinue preventing the use
period no nuisance to anybody-no actionable nuisance at all. (emphasis added.)
11 Ch. D. at 855.
The problem before the court was one concerning the existence of an actionable nuisance and
that question would not have been reached if it had been proved that no nuisance in fact
existed-as Coase has argued.
133. L.R. 5 Eq. 166 (1867-68).
134. 25 Q. B. D. 481 (1890).
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of the shaft for purposes of ventilation. The defendant relied on
Bryant and argued that no prescriptive right to the passage of air
could be acquired. 135 The court held for the plaintiff and required the
defendant to cease his activity of interfering with the plaintiff's use of
the ventilating shaft. The court found as a fact that the defendant had
had knowledge of the plaintiff's use of the shaft when he purchased
the premises, but perhaps more important, the court also found as a
fact that the shaft had existed and been used for ventilating purposes
for "many years-certainly forty years," and that the area in question
was one in which "many of the chambers have been excavated from
the rock rather than being built in the ordinary way."' 1 36 Coase has
argued that this case was no different from Bryant and that the
movement of air in general across the defendant's land in Bryant was
equivalent to the movement of the air in the shaft impeded in this
case by the defendant's activities. Thus he has remarked, "An
economist might be tempted to add 'but the air moved all the
same'.'137 But in this case the foul air not only moved in a
"well-defined" channel, there was no alternative method of ventilation available to the plaintiff. There was no mobility of resources.
Coase should have said that in Bryant "the smoke moved in a
well-defined channel, the chimney." In Bryant the plaintiff's chimneys could be built higher, while in Bass the alternative was
abandonment of use of the plaintiff's cellar.
The concept of social contract has sometimes been utilized by
social scientists interested in finding a quasi-legal framework within
which to advocate a laissez-faire system of social organization, and
Coase has devoted some space to a discussion of the "balancing of
interests" concept employed in deciding nuisance cases, apparently
with the thought in mind that the interests can be quantified in money
values. A more appropriate legal concept for use in philosophical
discussions of problems of environmental pollution seems to me to be
the tort of waste which can be dealt with by the equitable remedy of
injunction against waste. In 1908 one judge adopted the following
definition of waste:
... Waste is the destruction or improper deterioration or
material alteration of things forming an essential part of the
inheritance, done or suffered by a person rightfully in possession
by virtue of a temporary or partial estate as, for example, a tenant
for life or for years. The rightful possession of the wrongdoer is
essential and constitutes a material distinction between waste and
135. Id. at 483.
136. Id. at 482.
137. Coase, supra note 1, at 14.
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trespass. The remedy by injunction is fully established, and has not
only virtually superseded the old common law 'action of waste,'
but has to a great extent taken the place of 'action on the case' for
damages ....

138

We are all tenants for life of the environment and our possession is
rightful. The environment is an essential part of the inheritance, and
uncontrolled pollution constitutes a destruction or improper deterioration of that inheritance. Those who may from time to time
be in a position to make use of governmental power to preserve the
inheritance stand as trustees. Coase's argument rests on an assumption
that the waste is "inevitable." I have shown in this paper that it need
not be. The inheritance includes also improvments of the land. I have
made no case for the counterrevolution's aim of establishment of a
state of nature inhabited by noble savages. But that is another story.

138. Hayman v. Round, 22 Neb. 598, 601, 118 N.W. 328, 329 (1908). The definition is a
quotation from 4 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, § 1348 (3d. ed. 1904).

